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Abstract
The Almohad (1120-1269) displaced the Almoravid dynasty (1040-1147) as the
rulers of the Maghreb and Andalusia in 1147 and created the largest Berber kingdom in
history. They conquered the first indigenous rulers of the Maghreb by aggregating the
Masmuda tribes from the High Atlas Mountains and enlisting the Zenata and Arab tribes
from the Northern Maghreb. The Almohad rule built upon the existing Almoravid
infrastructure; however, their cultural, administrative, and military approach entailed a
more integrated tribal organization, centralized authority, and an original Islamic
ideology. In creating this empire they envisioned the Maghreb as a consolidated political
center and not a periphery adjunct to the Abbasid caliphate. They would consolidate the
Maghreb, the Balearic Islands, and Ifriqiya and eventually proclaim their own caliphate.
They returned al-Andalus to its former glory of the Umayyads and stemmed the southern
advance of the Christian kingdoms of Iberia for one hundred years. Then in 1212, at the
height of their power, they lost the decisive battle of Las Navas de Tolosa and within
twenty years were all but removed from al-Andalus. This sudden decline has been
attributed to lack of support of the Maliki ulema, whom they challenged with their newly
envisioned religious theology, and internecine tribal conflicts. These elements assuredly
attributed to the Almohad disappearance from al-Andalus and their eventual defeat in the
Maghreb by the Marinids; however, a primary contributor to their demise, that is often
overlooked or underestimated, was the dissipation and loss of control of their economy.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Thesis
There has been an outpouring of scholarship regarding the Almohad in the last
twenty years and a reexamination of their ideological and cultural impact on the Maghreb
and al-Andalus. This paper will fill an existing void in the scholarship and emphasize the
role the economy played in the ability of the Almohad to build an empire and why they,
at the height of their power, all but disappeared from al-Andalus less than twenty years
after the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Scholars such as Huici Miranda, Abun
Nasr, and most recently Bennison have examined the Almohad decline and focused on
the cultural, religious, and idealistic reasons for their collapse. Huici Miranda, who
completed one of the most extensive works on the Almohad, attributed their failure to the
loss of control of the Arabs tribes in the Maghreb and the Almohad “tyrannical” rule in
al-Andalus that encouraged resistance of their co-religionists in the peninsula.1 Abun
Nasr characterized this Berber empire as unable to sustain a religio-political ideal that
was contrary to the Maliki standard, which eventually led to their replacement by the less
ideologically-driven Marinids.2 Bennison, in her extensively researched monograph, The
Almoravid and Almohad Dynasties, attributed the dissolution of the Almohad to tribal
rivalries, the challenges of managing an empire of its size, and finally, to the “eccentricity
of their caliphate” which limited the amount of religious support they could expect from

Ambrosio Huici Miranda, Historia política del imperio Almohade (Tetuán: Imprenta Morocco, 1957),
578.
2 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), 102. The Marinids would return to the Maliki school of Islam versus the distinctive Almohad
doctrine.
1
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Maliki ulema.3 Whereas each of these elements mentioned above contributed to the
eventual disintegration of the Almohad caliphate, this thesis will view the undoing of
their empire holistically, weighing the economic factors from the Maghreb, al-Andalus,
and the Christian kingdoms of Iberia. It will argue that the Almohad suffered from a
weakened economic position in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, and that this was the critical
factor that led to their demise. This thesis will shift the emphasis of the arguments made
in the current historiography away from the religious-idealistic to the economicmaterialist. This paper will thus demonstrate that the economic disruption experienced by
the Almohad exacerbated the fault lines of inter-tribal cohesion in the Maghreb and
weakened their ability to compete with the northern Christian kingdoms for territorial
control.
1.2 Background
At the height of Almoravid power, during the reign of their third sultan, Ali Ibn
Yusuf (r. 1084-1143), an unknown cleric emerged from a ten-year sojourn to Damascus
and Cairo, where he had studied with the most prominent philosophers of his time and
sharpened his vision of what Islam should be and how it should be practiced. This
unknown cleric, Ibn Tumart (r. 1120-1130), became the founder of the Almohad dynasty
that challenged, and eventually toppled, the Almoravid, the first indigenous empire of the
Maghreb. After his return to his homeland in 1120, Tumart had gathered an insignificant
following, but this did not deter him from challenging the Almoravid, the highest
authorities of the Maghreb, as to what he perceived to be their malpractice of Islam.

Amira K. Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2016), 333.
3
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How did the Almohad achieve this transition with less men, fewer resources, and
no infrastructure against the strongest, most entrenched rule the Maghreb had ever
known? At the time of Ibn Tumart’s return, the Almoravid kingdom stretched from the
Southern Sahara to Zaragoza in Iberia, from the Atlantic to Argel, in present day Algiers,
and controlled more gold than any previous kingdom in the Maghreb or al-Andalus. The
Almoravid had defeated León-Castile, the strongest Christian kingdom in Iberia, at the
Battle of Sagrajas in 1086, and this victory still resounded in the hearts and minds of their
followers on both sides of the Pillars of Hercules. Did the Almohad accelerate a corrosion
that was already in motion? What were the fundamental building blocks of the Almohad
empire that allowed them to replace the Almoravid?
In attempting to understand the Almoravid decline and the Almohad foundation it
is instructive to look to the preeminent historian of his time, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).
Khaldun, in The Muqaddimah,4 is thought to have modeled the Almoravid and Almohad
dynasties as exemplary of the rise and fall of states. Khaldun describes the ascension and
descent of the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties as embodying a process whereby
“prestige lasts at best four generations in one lineage.”5 This deterioration, according to
Khaldun, was a natural, four-step transition in which a dynasty’s initial desert toughness
transitioned to the comforts of sedentary culture; then proceeded to a generation with no
memory of the founding values; and passed finally to an unstable fourth generation,
which was ripe for collapse. In his analysis, Khaldun described an evolution whereby

Ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami, Abu Zayd ‘Abd al-Rahman, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J.
Dawood (New York: Princeton University Press, 1967).
5 Ibid., 105-106.
4
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over the course of time, the asibiya, the group cohesion, which served as the emotional
and spiritual emulsifier that held dynasties together, slowly atrophied and finally
disappeared. The Almoravid and Almohad’s experience supported Khaldun’s theory, as
did the historical trajectory of the Marinids (1244-1465). The Hafsids 1229-1574, direct
descendants of the Almohad, would outlast them all, although theirs was a much smaller
state. In fact, modern studies support Khaldun’s assertion; these Maghreb dynasties were
not unique and fit into the worldwide pattern of the rise and fall of empires. Samuel
Arbesman, in his study of 41 large empires spanning 3000 BCE to 600 CE, determined
that the mean lifespan of kingdoms was 220 years,6 and the Almohad and the Almoravid
fit this model.
There are exceptions in the same geographic area and period that merit
mentioning. The Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) arguably existing in the same
geographical region and sharing some of the tools the Almohad used to build their state,
lasted 600 years. In Iberia, Castile’s kingdom lasted from 1065 to 1516, when they
transitioned to a consolidated Spain under Charles I (r. 1516-1556) after the death of
Ferdinand II (1516). These two aforementioned kingdoms are cited to illustrate that a
200-year lifespan of a state was not a foregone conclusion as argued by Khaldun and the
more recent analytical scholarship. Moreover the he Almohad experienced specific
events that led to their demise and should be understood outside of a statistical
epistemology.

Samuel Arbesman, “The Life-Span of Empires,” Historical Methods 44, no. 3 (2011): 128. See also: Rein
Taagepera, “Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia,” International
Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1997): 465-504.
6
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This paper will demonstrate that the Almohad built a more durable polity than the
Almoravid, and in spite of this, at the pinnacle of their reign, when their empire stretched
from Tripoli to the Balearics and from the Maghreb to al-Andalus, after they had
eliminated their most resolute internal enemies, their rule disintegrated.7 Their empire
held for over 100 years and four caliphal transitions, but they lost one battle and in less
than twenty years their rule in al-Andalus collapsed. The Almohad provide an example
that fits Khaldun’s formula; however, the loss of asibiya alone is not a satisfactory
explanation for their decline. They had built a more complex infrastructure than their
predecessors; they had a philosophy that was uniquely theirs. They, too, had met the
Christians on the battlefield and won,8 and their governing functions were structurally
stronger than the Almoravid.
The abrupt Almohad decline was therefore not inevitable. Most historians point to
the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) as the turning point in the Almohad rule of alAndalus. This battle represented the crossroads at which the fate of the Almohad within
the peninsula reversed itself, but this conflict proved not to be the reason for their decline.
There are specific explanations for the loss of this battle––logistics, amongst others––that
will be discussed in chapter 5. These issues were emblematic of larger fault lines within
the Almohad state; the seeds of their demise had already been sown. The Almohad, like
other kingdoms of the period, did not employ a standing army; men participated in battle
if they believed in the leaders and were paid. Troops calculated the probability of victory

Ibn Mardanis died in 1172 and Murcia had passed to the Almohad. The Balearic Islands had fallen to the
Almohad in 1203 when they eliminated the Ibn Ghaniya, the last Almoravid holdouts against their empire.
8 Alarcos (1195) was a resounding victory for the Almohad and will be discussed in more detail further on
in this paper.
7
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and remuneration when determining their assistance to the call to arms. While there were
improvements to warfare and munitions at the time, by far the most influential variable in
the equation of war in the twelfth century was a leader’s ability to inspire confidence in
his troops and ensure that they received compensation. Many important sieges would
occur in this period (Santarém, Toledo, Badajoz, Zaragoza), and siege engines, crossbow
technology, and cavalry tactics were important in victory. But the three most critical
campaigns of the period, Sagrajas (1086), Los Arcos (1195), and Las Navas de Tolosa
(1212), were settled in open field conflicts that determined, in some large part, the
direction of who would control al-Andalus.
These battles were not strategic master plans by modern standards;9 Huici
Miranda, who studied these three aforementioned campaigns in great depth, makes this
point. Assuredly, this lack of grand strategies favored the bold and the more adept, but
undoubtedly, the number of men had an outsized influence on victory. Determining the
exact numbers of fighting men in this period is complicated; however, the literature that
describes the battles at Sagrajas and Alarcos appears to substantiate that victory favored
the largest army.10 At Las Navas de Tolosa, by contrast, contemporary chroniclers
indicate that the Christians were outnumbered but experienced victory in spite of this
disadvantage. However, they had assembled a much larger group of fighting men than in
their previous losses and history underscores that the dedication and enthusiasm of the

Ambrosio Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas de la reconquista durante las invasiones africanas
(Almorávides, Almohades y Benimerines) (Tetuán: Imprenta Cremades, 1956), 12.
10 In both Christian and Muslim sources Alfonso VII was admonished for his impatience and not waiting
for reinforcements. At Las Navas de Tolosa it is difficult to determine the exact numbers of troops
involved; however, it is known that the Christians had assembled one of the largest contingents in the
history of Iberia and even the Muslim sources write “that they had assembled more men than they had in
hundreds of years.”
9
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Almohad troops was suspect at best. Why the Almohad had lost their enthusiasm and
how the Christians’ approach to battle preparations evolved in the 110-year period
between their loss at Sagrajas and victory at Las Navas is essential to our understanding
of the Almohad decline. The conflict between the Almohad and their Christian rivals was
as much an economic competition as a military struggle. How the northern Christian
kingdoms harnessed more resources at the expense of the Almohad to change the
momentum in Iberia will be explained in section 5.1 of this paper.
The other aspect that must be considered when evaluating the Almohad rapid
demise was that they had attempted to build a state and an empire at the same time. Much
of the foundation of statehood was in place: they established a religious philosophy that
promoted cohesion; they developed institutions such as the treasury and the judiciary that
survived dynastic transitions; and they integrated leadership from various tribes to
conduct cohesive group actions. However, parallel to building their governing apparatus,
they were also assembling an empire. There were, at minimum, four geographic regions
that required their attention: the Maghreb, Ifriqiya, the Balearic islands, and al-Andalus,
the latter of which included five independent Christian principalities they had to confront
and a strong Muslim resistance represented by Ibn Madarnis. This required resources and
control of the economy that, initially, the Almohad accomplished.
The Almohad developed a more centralized state than the Almoravid, which
allowed them to dominate the periphery and extract resources more efficiently; 11 they fit

Pascal Buresi and Hicham El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in the Almohad
Caliphate (1224-1269) (Leiden: Brill, 2013). See also Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires,
214.
11
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Motyl’s definition of empire as a “core elite and state [that] dominated peripheral elites…
and channeled resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery.” 12
However, as Joseph Tainter emphasizes in his The Collapse of Complex Societies,
economic factors represent one of the key reasons for the decline of empires, and this
would play a more significant role in the Almohad decline than has been discussed by
previous scholars.13
This paper will document that by the period of Las Navas the Almohad dynasty
had lost much of its economic vigor. Due to Christian aggression, the Almohad
controlled considerably less population and tax revenue than they had before in alAndalus. Their gold production in the Maghreb had declined 90 percent from its height
under their first caliph, Abd al Mu’min. Their internal economy had weakened because of
the focus on trade with the Mediterranean and their supply lines within the Maghreb were
being attacked by discontented Marinid (Zenata) tribes. These deficiencies would affect
their ability to control the competing clans that they had aggregated at their founding. A
certain amount of force majeure would factor into the Almohad decline; however, how
their mismanagement of controllable events proved more detrimental than natural causes.

Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001), 4. “Core elites craft
foreign and defense policy, control the armed forces, regulate the economy, process information, maintain
law and order, extract resources, pass legislation, and oversee borders. In turn, peripheral elites implement
core policies,” 15. “This entails a shift of the state’s economic centre of gravity away from its historic core
to a new economic centre located elsewhere in its territory… As a result of this an entirely new centre of
population emerges which is likely to have very different social and cultural values from those of the core
state,” 53.
13 Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
42. Other reasons for decline emphasized by Tainter were: insufficient response to circumstances;
intruders; class conflict; elite mismanagement or misbehavior; chance concatenation of events; depletion or
cessation of a vital resource or resources on which the society depends; the establishment of a new resource
base; the occurrence of some insurmountable catastrophe; and mystical factors, all of which the Almohad
experienced at various levels.
12

8

One variable they could not control, that represented a much different landscape than
what the Almoravid before them had faced, was a strengthening of the northern Christian
kingdoms.
The Christian powers of Iberia while still jockeying amongst themselves for
control of the northern territories, had made fundamental political and military
improvements to their kingdoms during the transition between the Almoravid and
Almohad empires. The marriage of Petronilla (r. 1137-1164) and Ramon Berenguer IV
(r. 1131-1162) combined the regions of Aragon and Catalonia, resulting in a stronger
polity. The Christian states during the eleventh and twelfth centuries systematically
conquered territory and gained its affiliate tax revenue. The taking of Toledo (1085) by
Castile, Zaragoza (1118) by Aragon, and Santarém (1147) by Portugal pushed the
Christian defensive demarcation 160 miles south, from the Duero to the Tagus river, and
by 1200 they controlled 50 percent of the population of Iberia.14 This was a liminal
period where many advances by the Christian kingdoms were most probably
imperceptible to the contestants of the confrontation; but when seen in their totality it is
understood that each decision enhanced the ability of the northern states to resist the
Almohad advance.
Fueros (community land grants), frontier settlement, and papal and local church
support were all augmented in this period. As city charters of the frontier, fueros
encouraged repopulation with men on a constant war-footing. These land grants provided

David Cuberes and Rafael González-Val, “The Effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities,”
Annals of Regional Science 58, no. 3 (2017): 378. See Figure 14 in the appendix for the river systems of
Spain.
14
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settlers new rights and the possibility of gaining position and something to fight for,
creating a second generation of adventurers like Rodrigo de Vivar (Cid el Campeador). In
the period leading up to Las Navas, in particular between 1095 to 1212, fueros were
smaller and more egalitarian than they would come to be after this period, when they
would come to be dominated by larger land holders. 15 The implementation of fueros to
populate newly acquired territory with an economic and military presence, coupled with
the increased control of a larger share of the Iberian tax base, made the North a more
formidable adversary. Much of the military presence was provided by Christian military
orders who were often granted these fueros.
The original Christian military orders, namely the Hospitallers and the Templars,
were welcomed by the Northern Iberian kingdoms as early as 1120,16 and the Christian
monarchs would add to their number by founding their own. The most prominent
examples were the orders of Calatrava (1158) founded in Navarre and later controlled by
Castile; Santiago (1170) and Alcántara (1176) founded in León; and Avis (1162) founded
in Portugal. These mercenary times, with no standing armies, required both sides of the
conflict to call for men that expected to be paid and collect booty for their efforts. In the
Christian north, the combination of founding fueros and military orders created a more
stable defensive military presence than the Almohad’s itinerant and provisional troops.

Ignacio Álvarez Borge, “Soldadas, situadas y fisco en el reinado de Alfonso VIII de Castilla (11581214),” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 7, no. 1 (2015): 64. See also Santos M. Corones González,
Fueros locales del reino de León (910-1230) (Madrid: Agencia Estatal Boletine del Estado, 2018).
15 Tomas Muñoz y Romero, Colección de fueros municipales de los pueblos de Castilla, León, Aragón y
Navarra (Madrid: Imprenta de Don José María Alonso, 1847).
16 A. J. Forey, “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century,”
Traditio 40 (1984): 198.
15
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Almohad victories, on the other hand, could not have been contemplated if their fellow
tribesmen from the Maghreb and the Arabs from Ifriqiya had not agreed to cross the
straits to fight in Iberia, which was predicated on the caliphate’s ability to fund these
efforts.
The Christians did not present a consolidated front against the Almohad.
Negotiation between themselves, cajoling and threats from the pope, and support of the
local church were all required to unite them to fight their southern foes. The conciliatory
efforts of the church did not bring an end to the bickering, raiding, and wars between the
northern states of Christendom; that would not occur for another 250 years. But there
were moments, Las Navas de Tolosa the most prominent, when the church’s intervention
coincided with a rare coordination of northern Christian monarchs to aid their eventual
victory.
The Christian conquest of Toledo in 1085 and the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa
in 1212 frame the period of the Almoravid and the Almohad presence in Spain. The
Almohad entered al-Andalus in 1147 and would not leave the peninsula until 1248.17 Las
Navas de Tolosa unlocked al-Andalus from the Muslim grip and the Christian armies
now marched south past the Guadiana and Guadalquivir rivers, 18 which had been under
Muslim control for 500 years. In the East, Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1213-1276), son of one
of the heroes of Las Navas, Peter II, would sail from Barcelona, conquer the Balearics

One could argue that the Reconquista period, a mercurial date to pin down, did not begin until 1212,
when the victory for the Christian North led to a cascade of victories leaving only Granada unconquered
after 1248. Toledo (1085) and Zaragoza (1118) had fallen into Christian hands before Las Navas de Tolosa
(1212); however, in the subsequent thirty-six years the majority of al-Andalus fell into Christian hands:
Mallorca (1229); Cordoba (1236); Valencia (1238); Murcia (1243); and Seville (1248), leaving only
Granada as an independent Muslim state.
18 See Figure 14 in appendix for Iberian river systems.
17
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(1229), control the Western Mediterranean, and later advance from the Ebro to the Jucar
river to conquer Valencia (1238). It is impossible to separate these northern dynamics
from those of the Almohad reign, as al-Andalus was the single wealthiest domain of the
Almohad, and the Christian antagonists comprised the most formidable threats to their
empire. Much of the Almohad decline can be attributed to their own actions; however,
the competition from the Christian kingdoms for the resources of al-Andalus was the
strongest it had ever been since Arabs and Berbers had conquered Iberia in 711.
This paper will focus on the period between 1147 and 1212 as it represents the
timespan when the Almohad presence in al-Andalus was most prominent (they remained,
in limited form, until 1248). In chapter 2 important primary sources and secondary
historiography utilized for this study will be examined. Chapter 3 will frame the historical
background with a brief overview of Islam’s entrance into al-Andalus and the events that
led to the Almoravid’s invitation to enter Iberia. This chapter will also explore the
transition from the Almoravid to the rise of the Almohad empire. Finally, this chapter
will describe the changing dynamics of Christian Iberia during the Berber presence in the
peninsula. Chapter 4 will describe the foundation of the Almohad religion, culture, and
governing mechanisms, and discuss how initial fault lines were woven into the fabric of
the Almohad rule as they mixed the Masmuda tribes with Kumiya (Zenata) leadership.
Chapter 5 will share insights into what the change in population in Iberia, the growth of
military orders, and the founding of fueros had on the ability of the Christian kingdoms to
resist the Almohad. The events leading up to the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa and how
the decisions on both sides of the Tagus river led to the defeat of the Almohad will also
12

be reviewed. How the Almohad grasp on their economy began to slip and why this led to
their expulsion from al-Andalus will also be examined. Chapter 6 will offer final insights
and conclusions as to why the Almohad fell and eventually disappeared.

13

Chapter 2 Historiography
The Almohad have received increased attention in the last two decades and much
of this research has been focused on reevaluating the earlier cursory overview that they
received as a foil for the Reconquista history of al-Andalus. Even in works published
during the explosion of Spanish historiography of the 1970s and 1980s, by Collins, Glick,
Harvey, and Wasserstein, to name a few, none dedicated a specific monograph to this
dynasty. Renewed scrutiny has brought the Almohad dynasty into clearer relief, although
many opportunities for study and analysis remain. The primary Muslim and Christian
sources available provide ample opportunity to understand the political and military
actions of the period, although any specific numerical data available as regards troop
sizes and casualties must be viewed with skepticism. Unfortunately, there is scant
economic data from which to calculate government expenditures or tax receipts;
however, some inferences can shed light on how their economy functioned.
A reevaluation of the primary sources on both sides of the straits is underway,19
and more study of the Almohad dynastic archives, such as that conducted by Buresi and
El Aallaoui, is beginning.20 More archeological work is also being conducted, such as
Ron Messier’s project in Aghmat, which is excavating the Almohad’s early presence in
this area;21 as well as excavations and surveys being conducted in Spain and Portugal

For an excellent summary of the Almohad primary sources see Sebastián Gaspariño García, “Las fuentes
de la historia Almohade,” Revista Al-Mulk 11 (2013): 25-49.
20 Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire.
21 This work is not complete or published, however, Messier gave the author permission to visit this site
that is unearthing an Almohad mosque, hammam, and living quarters.
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examining the presence of Christians and Muslims of the period.22 With this in mind, the
historiographical review of the material utilized to research this paper will be divided into
the most influential primary and secondary sources. The majority of the secondary
sources have been published since 1990, although there are some earlier foundational
studies that have been utilized, such as Tomas Muñoz y Romero’s Colección de fueros
municipales de los pueblos de Castilla, León, Aragón y Navarra, published in 1847.
2.1 Primary Sources
The first of the primary sources that presents an eye-witness account of the
period, is that of the court scribe, Ibn Sahib al-Sala (d. 1200-1210), a native of Beja in the
Algarve, who wrote Al-Mann Bil-Imama.23 Although Ibn Sahib provides an obviously
laudatory document of the Almohad regime, he nevertheless offers a first-hand account
of the Almohad dynasty under the Caliph Yousuf I (r. 1163-1184), arguably the most
successful of all Almohad leaders.24 While clearly an encomium, it is the only historical
narrative that is solely dedicated to Almohad history, and as such provides invaluable
details regarding the inner workings of the central Almohad state. Another source,
Colección de crónicas árabes de la Reconquista volumen IV, Kitab al-Mu’yuib fi taljis
ajbar al-Magrib,25 offers an account by a court courtesan, Abu Muhammad ‘Abd alWahid Al-Marrakusi. Leví-Provençal describes this account as “vulgar,” as it did not

Magdalena Valor and Avelino Gutiérrez, The Archaeology of Medieval Spain 100-1500 (Sheffield, UK:
Equinox, 2014). The authors point out that the study of archaeology in medieval Spain has increased
dramatically since 1985 and had many more opportunities for discovery.
23 Ibn Sahib Al-Sala, Al-Mann Bil-Imama, trans. Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Valencia: Anubar, 1968).
24 Ibid., 5-6.
25 Abu Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahid Al-Marrakusi, Colección de crónicas árabes de la Reconquista volumen
iv, Kitab al-Mu’yuib fi taljis ajbar al-Magrib, tran. Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Tetuán: Editora Morocco,
1955).
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conform to this French historian’s scholarly standards. Huici Miranda, however, sees
value in this eye-witness telling of events, as Abd al-Wahid served the brother of the
fourth Caliph (~1209) and at one point had a private interview with his successor, Yusuf
II.26 The salience of this source is that ‘Abd al-Wahid was present at the transition of
power between the two teenage kings of the empire as it was collapsing in al-Andalus,
and he wrote only twelve years after the pivotal battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212).
A more sober view of the dynasty is provided by the considerable number of state
documents and letters that have been uncovered. An important example by Pascal Buresi
and Hicham El Aallaoui’s is their Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in
the Almohad Caliphate.27 The authors present a detailed analysis of seventy-seven
provincial government documents that describe secondary governmental appointments,
where non-family members such as Maliki jurists from al-Andalus, received
commissions. These documents demonstrate that even as the Almohad were in decline,
their centralized administration continued to function, at least for a period.
The third group of available primary sources consists of contemporaneous
documents written in Iberia that underscore how the Almohad operated their Andalusian
territory. These sources provide insight into how the Almohad were perceived by the coreligionists they conquered and by their Christian rivals. One of the indispensable
accounts of these Iberian sources is Las memorias de ‘Abd Allah, who was the last Zirid
king of Granada.28 This recounts the history of how ‘Abd Allah (r. 1073-1090) was

Ibid., 246. Yusuf II is mainly referred to in this document as al-Mustansir.
Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire.
28 Ibn Buluggin, ‘Abd Allah, Las memorias de ‘Abd Allah, ultimo rey Ziri de Granada, detronado por los
Almorávids (1090), trans. E. Levi-Provencal and Emilio García Gómez (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1980).
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unseated by the Almoravid before the arrival of the Almohad. This memoir provides one
of the only first-person narratives of a taifa29 king and how he attempted to balance the
Christians’ demand for parias (tribute) against the newly arrived Berber tribes, meant to
rescue him from his Christian adversaries. ‘Abd Allah’s dilemma, that of an Andalusian
Muslim city-state attempting to maximize its own power by leveraging the Berber
conquerors against its Christian neighbors, is an oft-repeated dynamic in the twelfth and
thirteenth century, and contributes to the understanding of the tension that existed
between the newly arrived Berbers and their native Iberian co-religionists. This balancing
act was not successfully managed by ‘Abd Allah; he lost his kingdom to the Almoravid
and was ignobly shipped off to Aghmat, where he would live out his days with a small
state stipend and finish his memoirs.
A Christian perspective of the same period was preserved by the first-hand
account of The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile,30 written in the first third of the
thirteenth century by a clergyman, most likely the bishop of Osma. This account not only
provides a Christian perspective of the Almohad during their ascent and decline within
al-Andalus, but also describes the internecine arguments, negotiations, and warfare
amongst the Christian kingdoms themselves. Not unlike ‘Abd Allah of Granada, these
Christian kingdoms were not above crossing the religious divide to formalize agreements
with the Almohad to better compete with their rival kingdoms. León and Navarre, in
particular, opportunistically fought alongside the Almohad to attack their weaker and

After the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate (1031) al-Andalus fractured into thirty-eight city states, taifas,
the Arab word for parties.
30The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile, ed. and trans. Joseph F. O’Callaghan (Arizona: Arizona
Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002).
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stronger foes of Portugal and Castile respectively. Additionally, this account shares a
clear picture of the jealousies and grudges held by the competing monarchs, that often
influenced their political actions. One prominent example is represented by Alfonso IX of
León (r. 1188-1230) who would not soon forget the degrading ceremony at Carrion
(1188), where he was forced to take a knee to his older cousin, Alfonso VIII of Castile (r.
1158-1214), which in part explains Alfonso IX’s absence at Las Navas de Tolosa.31
The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile functions well as a sister document to
the work of the archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada’s The History of the
Affairs of Spain.32 Jiménez de Rada’s account proves invaluable, as he became the
emissary between the papacy and Castile, and was instrumental in rallying support from
Rome, Southern France, and Iberia for the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. He was the
noble son of a Castilian family through his mother and Navarre through his father, who
had served in the court of Alfonso VIII of Castile. This background made Rodrigo de
Rada (1170-1247) the ideal candidate to be the ecclesiastic right-hand of Alfonso VIII,
and Rodrigo aided him through his travails and victories, including being present at the
battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. 33 Rodrigo de Rada contributes a first-hand account of the
preparation for Las Navas and through him one understands how Alfonso avoided many
of the military and political missteps made at Alarcos, and gains a further perspective of
how the church and the state worked hand in hand during this time frame.

Ibid., 22-23, 28.
Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Historia de los hechos de España, ed. and trans. Juan Fernández Valverde
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989).
33 Ibid., 19.
31
32

18

A second group of primary sources is comprised of the near-contemporary
Muslim historians of the period; the two most valuable being Ibn Idhari and Ibn Khaldun.
Idhari, from Marrakech, completed his two-tome, 700-page Al-Bayan al Maghreb 34 in
1312, and lived in close proximity-–physically and chronologically––to the birthplace of
the Almohad dynasty. Huici Miranda argues that because Idhari was beholden to the
succeeding dynasty, the Marinids, and not the Almohad whom they replaced, his account
presents an objective depiction of Almohad history. In fact, Idhari on numerous
occasions, when hindsight would have allowed him to condemn actions taken by the
Almohad, provides a relatively non-partisan view of events. While little is known of
Idhari, his is considered the most detailed narrative of Arab/Berber origin, and his work
contains information not found in either Khaldun or Christian sources, and as such it is
central to understanding the Almohad dynasty. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), born in Tunisia
to a wealthy Andalusian Arab family, is most famously known for Al-Muqaddima,35 and
is considered the most insightful historian of the period. Khaldun, as opposed to many
Arab sources, is regarded as objective and considered in his narratives. Additionally, his
model of how kingdoms were established and declined was formed from his study of the
Almoravid and Almohad dynasties.
As stated earlier, Al-Mann bil-Imama, Al-Bayan al Maghreb, and Colección de
crónicas árabes de la Reconquista volumen iv are foundational primary sources for our
understanding of the Almohad movement. Much of the credit for bringing these works

Ibn Idhari al-Marrakusi, Abu al-Abbas Ahmad Ibn Muhammad, Al Bayan al-Mugrib fi ijtisar ajbar mulk
Al-Andalus wa Al-Magrib (Los Almohads), trans. Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Tetuán: Editora Morocco,
1953).
35 Ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami, Abu Zayd ‘Abd al-Rahman, The Muqaddimah.
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into wider circulation goes to Ambrosio Huici Miranda (1880-1973), who translated these
and other important Arabic documents into Spanish. It could be argued that Huici
Miranda was overshadowed by two of his contemporaries, Reinhart Dozy (1820-1883)
and Menéndez Pidal (1869-1968). Dozy and Pidal created the foundation upon which
much of the subsequent historiography of medieval Iberia is based, and they are still
widely cited and discussed.36 Dozy, in particular, uncovered and translated many original
Arab documents and Huici Miranda acknowledges his debt to this historian’s
foundational efforts. The corner stone of Islamic Spanish history, Dozy’s Spanish
Spain,37 terminates with the end of the taifa period; however, if the Almohad empire is to
be understood within the larger Reconquista narrative, historians must still rely on Dozy,
as he translated many of the Arab sources from North Africa.
As regards the Almohad, Huici Miranda is universally appreciated as one of the
premier scholars of this period and his work is still referenced.38 Not only did he translate
into Spanish the three works mentioned above, but he also translated the anonymous AlHulal al Mawsiyya, Crónica árabe de las dinastias Almoravide, Almohade y Benimerin,39
and Rawd Al-Qirtas, by Ibn Abi Zar.40 The anonymous al-Hulal was finalized in 1381

For an excellent summary of the Almohad historiography by Spanish historians see Isabel O’Conner,
“The Fall of the Almohad Empire in the Eyes of Modern Spanish Historians,” Islam and Christian-Muslim
Relations 14, no. 2 (2003): 145-162. She traces the view of the Almohad from Cordero in the late 1800s to
Pidal and Dozy; she also outlines the dispute between Alborñoz and Castro. She recognizes the value of
Huici Miranda’s foundational work and his relative objectivity when compared to the previous generation
of historians. As mentioned in footnote no. 16, for a thorough review of the Almohad primary sources see
Gaspariño García, “Las fuentes de la historia Almohade,” 25-49.
37 Reinhart Dozy, Spanish Islam, trans. Francis Griffin Stokes (London: Goodword Books, 1913).
38 Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires, 198; Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire;
José Ramírez del Rio, “Documentos sobre el papel de los árabes Hilalies en el al-Andalus Almohade:
traducción y análisis,” Al-Qantara 35, no. 2 (2014): 360.
39 Al-Hulal al Mawsiyya, crónica árabe de las dinastías Almoravide, Almohade y Benimerin, trans.
Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Tetuán: Editora Marroquí, 1951).
40 Ibn Abi Zar al-Fasi, Rawd Al-Qirtas, trans. Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Valencia: J. Nácher, 1963), 16-18.
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and is recognized as primarily a compilation of other authors such as Ibn Qattan and Ibn
Sahib mentioned above, whereas Rawd Al-Qirtas was finalized in 1348 out of Fez. Both
Dozy and Huici Miranda recognize little value in Rawd al-Qirtas, referring to it as “very
fallible” and “prone to exaggeration.”
Two other first-hand primary sources, Al Baydhaq and Al-Muqtabas min kitab alAnsab, unfortunately for non-Arab speakers, have not been translated into Spanish or
English; however, Huici Miranda does incorporate much of these authors’ works and
insights into his histories and commentary. The first, Al Baydhaq, composed in 1150 by
one of the original Almohad converts, Abu Bakr b. Ali al-Sanjhaji, provides insights into
the philosophy of Ibn Tumart, his early travels, and the background to the foundation of
the empire. The second, Kitab al-Ansab,41 written by Abu Salih b. Abi Salih ‘Abd alHalim al-Masmudi, preserves the genealogy of the organization of the Almohad, most
critically that of Ibn Tumart and Abd al-Mu’min. It contributes a detailed report of the
Masmuda tribes of the Almohad and importantly the tribe of Abd al-Mu'min, the
Kumiya. This compendium established the link of Ibn Tumart and Abd al-Mu’min with
the tribe of the prophet Mohammad, although most historians agree that this connection is
at best a hypothesis, and more realistically a fabrication.
2.2 Secondary Sources, Huici Miranda
Ambrosio Huici Miranda’s two-volume work, Historia del imperio Almohad and
his Las grandes batallas de la reconquista durante las invasiones Africanas (Amorávides,

41

First extant copy made in 1314.
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Almohades y Benimerines),42 are contemporarily sourced as authoritative histories of the
period. Huici Miranda’s value is that his translator’s instincts and attention to detail are
apparent in his scrutiny of historical events, and he provides clear insights into the Arab
authors he translated; he is quick to point out their inconsistencies and exaggerations, as
he is of Christian sources as well. One can particularly appreciate that he walked the
fields of the battles that he described, often dispelling exaggerated rhetoric through
simple observation. For example, he dismissed the idea that the Almohad “surprised”
Alfonso at Alarcos, as the battlefield itself is an open plain with no opportunity for either
combatant to mount an unanticipated attack. 43
As with most historians of this period who write about the Almohad, Huici
Miranda relies heavily on Ibn Khaldun as a serious source; however, he also respects Ibn
Idhari as a reliable chronicler of the time. Huici Miranda triangulates all information
available to him to arrive at a sober and objective evaluation of what occurred, avoiding a
Reconquista polemic which might exaggerate the strengths or weaknesses of either side
of the conflict. Huici Miranda represents a key contributor to the historiography of the
Almohad and he uses many of the original sources, such as Al Bayan and Al-Mann BilImam, but also others that have yet to be translated into a European language. He
references Dozy on many occasions and while complimentary of this great scholar, with
whom he was a colleague and collaborator, he does not shy from voicing disagreements
with him when the need arises. On the occasions he does disagree, it is often because he

Ambrosio Huici Miranda, Historia política del imperio Almohade; Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas
de la reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Almorávides, Almohades y Benimerines).
43 Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas de la reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Almorávides,
Almohades y Benimerines), 12.
42

22

had access to later material unavailable to Dozy, which he is quick to acknowledge.
While Huici Miranda occasionally can lapse into certain prejudices of his time, one has to
acknowledge that in general he is a reliable historian of this period. Finally, Huici
Miranda brings added perspective to the discussion of the Almohad by utilizing sources
and insights that describe what occurred in the Christian kingdoms and how they dealt
with their southern neighbors and each other.
2.3 Secondary Sources, Other
In addition to the outpouring of scholarly articles on the Almohad since 2000, two
books have been published in the last ten years: Allen Fromherz’s The Almohads: The
Rise of an Islamic Empire (2000)44 and Amira Bennison’s The Almoravid and Almohad
Empires (2016).45 Both are thoroughly researched; Fromherz focuses on the
philosophical underpinnings of Almohad ideology, and Bennison provides welldocumented insights into both dynasties’ economic and cultural dynamics. Bennison does
much to refute previous facile characterizations of these regimes and from the outset
describes them as important dynasties of the period.46 She details their social, religious,
artistic, and architectural accomplishments, and how they developed their economies
through irrigation, agriculture, grain harvesting, and the Saharan gold and salt trade.47
The other monograph that merits mentioning is David Wasserstein’s The Rise and
Fall of the Party Kings: Politics and Society in Islamic Spain, 1002-1086.48 While this
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was published earlier (1985) than the two works mentioned above, it is indispensable to
the understanding of the Berber invasion of al-Andalus. It was after the fall of the
Umayyad dynasty (1031) that al-Andalus shattered into thirty-eight separate kingdoms,
or taifas (parties).49 Wasserstein points out that unexpectedly a competition emerged
among many of these rulers to create higher culture, and the arts were sponsored and
flourished. Separately, he demonstrates that this fragmentation––divided by tribe, ethnic
groups, and the convenience of geography––weakened the Muslims and made them
vulnerable to the Christian north. It was during this period that the Christian kingdoms,
primarily Castile, demanded parias (tribute) of these Muslim city-states, which
eventually led the party kings to invite the Almoravid to enter Spain, resulting in the
consolidation of al-Andalus under their rule. As the Almoravid grip began to weaken;
however, al-Andalus once again broke apart, albeit in a more consolidated fashion. Glick
estimates that there were seventeen city-states during the second taifa period.50 While
Wasserstein’s does little to illuminate the reasons for the Almoravid and Almohad rise to
power, he does establish how the taifa kingdoms came to be, what their strengths and
weaknesses were, and why the taifa period in Iberia was such fertile ground for the
invasions of the Berber dynasties.
Since 2000, many scholarly papers have been published that analyze previously
underexplored aspects of the Almohad. Damien Smith and Michael Lower have written
about the activism of the papacy, the rallying of Christians in the Battle of Las Navas de

Ibid., 83-98.
Thomas Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages (Princeton: University of Princeton
Press, 1979), 47-48.
49
50

24

Tolosa, and Rome’s attitude towards Christian mercenaries in Muslim lands. 51 Damian
Smith’s “The Papacy, the Spanish Kingdoms and Las Navas de Tolosa,” confirms the
profound involvement of Innocent III and how he cajoled and threatened the Christian
kingdoms to participate in this battle.52 This article speaks to the attention and
involvement of the Church in the northern kingdoms and Almohad affairs. Regarding the
economy, David Abulafia’s article, “Christian Merchants in the Almohad Cities,”
summarizes the trade relationship and strong commercial alliances that the Almohad had
with the Genoese and other Italian city-states. Abulafia documents a fifteen-year
agreement that the Genoese signed with the Almohad, whereby the Genoese were free to
travel and trade in Almohad territory for a tax ranging from eight to ten percent. He also
records that the Genoese and the Pisans both had funduqs (warehouses) in many of the
major ports under Almohad control. This article provides crucial proof of how
commercial relationships were carried out in an expedient fashion when necessary, and
belies the notion of the Almohad were merely war-like fanatics, as the dynasty has often
been positioned.53
Maribel Fierro, in “Alfonso X ‘The Wise’: The Last Almohad Caliph?,”
hypothesizes how Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252-1284) may have borrowed from the
Almohad universal philosophy in his approach to governing. This article sets out to
establish the basis for the cultural impact of the Almohad in general, and specifically
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their influence on the Castilian king. This essay highlights that great Muslim thinkers, the
most notable of which was Averroes, thrived under the Almohad, and how this
contribution to early medieval philosophy is often swept under the rug of history. Fierro
delineates the major works of philosophy, medicine, botany, and logic that were
produced by the Almohad dynasty, noting that from the outset their philosophy was based
on learning. Finally, Fierro draws an intriguing parallel from the Almohad system of
intellectual patronage and politics to that of Alfonso X. One example was that Ibn Tumart
insisted that the Almohad daily prayers be written in the Berber vernacular, much as
Alfonso X had done with Castellano in Spain. This at once underscores the exchange of
ideas that occurred when these two cultures rubbed shoulders, and confirms the influence
of Ibn Tumart’s philosophy.54
Linda Jones, in her “The Preaching of the Almohads: Loyalty and Resistance
across the Strait of Gibraltar,”55 stresses the critical nature of the revolutionary ideas of
Ibn Tumart on the Almohad religious practice, and also emphasizes the role that sermons,
khutba, played in galvanizing the Almohad Berber tribes on both sides of the strait. She
confirms that the khutba is a “genre of Arabic ritualized oratory that pre-dates Islam and
was performed on important social occasions.”56 Jones argues that while much has been
made of coinage, art, and architecture in the establishment of Almohad hegemony, the
sermon has received scant observation. She believes that the preaching of the sermon
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proved a critical cultural emulsifier of the Almohad tribes as they crisscrossed the
Maghreb, and later as they moved into al-Andalus. Because of its pre-Islamic roots,
coupled with its inextricable ties to Islam itself––the Quran means “to recite”––the power
of oratory was not only culturally meaningful, but had implied roots back to Muhammad
and helped to legitimize the constructed genealogy that the Almohad “discovered” for Ibn
Tumart. Ibn Tumart spoke Berber and Arabic while preaching, and this made his new
Islamic ideology accessible to the Atlas tribes, and one might argue that for the first time
he allowed them to completely understand Islam. Indeed, it may have become a rite of
passage; Jones quotes the Marinid chronicler, Ibn Abi Zar, saying that the Almohad “did
not appoint anyone to the offices of khatib or prayer-leader who had not memorized the
creed of the divine in the Berber [language].”57 This linkage of revolutionary ideas of Ibn
Tumart to the Berber vernacular and to preaching ultimately provided the substrate upon
which the communication of philosophy, laws, and propaganda were disseminated to the
faithful.
Finally, much work has been completed that documents the establishment and
growth of the Christian military orders and how they functioned within the fueros during
this period. The seminal work regarding fueros was written in 1847 by Tomas Romero y
Muñoz: Colección de fueros municipales de los pueblos de Castilla, León, Aragón y
Navarra.58 This exhaustive compendium details the founding legal documents for these
municipalities and enumerates their quantity; much of the subsequent studies source
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Romero y Muñoz in their research. An example, Fueros locales del reino de León (9101230), written by Santos Corones Gonzalez, provides an in-depth view of the fueros of
León. 59 Both works mentioned above support the arguments made by the monograph of
James Powers, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the
Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284,60 and the article by Carlos Martínez Ayala, “Frontera y
órdenes militares en la edad media Castellano-Leonesa (Siglos XII-XIII).”61 Powers, and
more recently Ayala, contribute in-depth analysis of how the Christian military orders
and the fueros worked synergistically, and demonstrate that it was in the precise moment
of the Almohad presence in al-Andalus, and perhaps because of them, that the
phenomenon of Christian militias, municipal expansion, and repopulation occurred.
These four sources––contemporary primary authors; near contemporary medieval
historians; foundational Spanish historians such as Huici Miranda; and the recent
scholarly work represented in Bennison and Fromherz––inform the history of the
Almohad, how they came to power, what events they struggled with, and what led to their
decline. The history of the Almohad and the Almoravid is receiving new scrutiny within
the historical community and this attention has increased in the last decade. The most
recent monograph of Bennison is an excellent example of this work, as is the detailed
analysis of Buresi and El Aallaoui. The latter provides a guide to continued opportunities
in the field. More analysis of Almohad primary documents to better understand their

Santos Corones González ed., Fueros locales del reino de León (910-1230) (Madrid: Agencia Estatal
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60 James F. Powers, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle
Ages, 1000-1284 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
61 Carlos Martínez de Ayala, “Frontera y ordenes militares en la edad media Castellano-Leonesa (Siglos
XII-XIII),” Studia Historia, Historia Medieval (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2006).
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administration and in particular how they managed the economy offer fertile ground for
further study. Additionally, there is a growing interest in archeological work in Spain and
Morocco, and this analysis can provide insights into day-to-day living, as well as
population movements, to fill gaps that the written record is unable to accomplish.
Marrying current research, more detailed review of primary documents, and
archeological studies such as that of Messier, will provide deeper insight into the
Almohad empire, how it grew and sustained itself, and why it declined.
This thesis will contribute to the historiography of the Almohad through the
examination of the decline of their economy and how it accelerated their expulsion from
al-Andalus and their eventual replacement by the Marinids in the Maghreb. The
mounting strength of the Christian kingdoms’ economies through expansion of the
geography under their control, the advancement of their fuero programs, and the founding
of Christian military orders critically weakened the Almohad. At the same time, the
Almohad mining and agricultural productivity was deteriorating in the Maghreb which
strained their tribal fissures and provided openings for religious ulema and Arab tribe
dissent.
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Chapter 3 Historical Background
3.1 Islam’s Entrance into al-Andalus to the end of Umayyad Period (700-1031)
The original Umayyad caliphate in Damascus, which at the time included the
Maghreb and al-Andalus, had entered and conquered the Iberian peninsula in 711, but
subsequently lost control of their empire to the Abbasids in 750. The grandson of the
Umayyad Caliph Hisham II (r. 724-743), Abd al-Rahman I (r. 756-788), escaped death
from the Abbasids by swimming across the Euphrates,62 and during a five-year sojourn
through Egypt and North Africa, attempted to find an appropriate kingdom for the scion
of a dynasty. Eventually, he made his way to the Maghreb and crossed to al-Andalus
through the support of his mother’s Berber tribe, the Nazfa.63 Through negotiations with
the Syrian, Arab, and Berber tribes already residing in al-Andalus, Abd al-Rahman
secured his position and founded a dynasty that would last nearly 300 years (756-1031).64
Abd al-Rahman I established his kingdom in Cordoba and 150 years later, under the rule
of his namesake, Abd al-Rahman III (912-961), the eighth Umayyad prince, the capital
would be described as the ornament of the world,65 a title befitting one of Europe’s
largest cities.66 Abd Rahman III also proclaimed a new Umayyad caliphate, in part in
response to the Shiite Fatimids (909-1171) who had declared their own caliphate in

David James, A History of Early al-Andalus, The Akhbar Majmu’a (London: Routledge, 2012), 76-77.
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Heinrichs, consulted online March 2020.
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Ifriqiya in 909. During this period, Umayyad competition with the Fatimids for control of
the Maghreb was intense, 67 as each negotiated and cajoled the leading Berber tribes to
recognize their respective caliphates. The Umayyads supported the Zenata, and the
Fatimids the Zirids;68 however, neither sponsor-state led their clients to a consolidated
victory or established hegemony over the Maghreb for an extended period.
3.2 The Taifa Period to the Battle of Sagrajas (1031-1086)
The Umayyad caliphate disintegrated when Abd Rahman III died in 961, and his
weak son, Hisham II (r. 961-976), was left without an heir. During this era, referred to as
the taifa period (1031-1085), al-Andalus shattered into thirty-eight separate city-states,
and is best documented by Wasserstein’s The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings.69 As
Iberia disbanded into smaller entities, these taifas were unable to defend themselves from
the northern Christian kingdoms, in particular León-Castile, where Ferdinand I (r. 10371065) and his son, Alfonso VI (r. 1065-1109), were relentless in pursuit of paria
payments in exchange for peace. The northern Christian kingdoms slowly drained the
wealth of the independent city-states, such as Seville and Granada, as they levied
increasingly heavier tribute demands. Ferdinand I and Alfonso VI not only exacted
tribute, they also persistently pushed southward, taking Lemego and Viseu in 1055, and
Coimbra in 1064. This aggression would culminate in what would be considered the
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68 A Sanhaja tribe from the Maghreb.
69 Wasserstein, The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings.
67

31

crowning achievement of the Christian North for the next 120 years, when Alfonso VI
conquered the original Visigoth capital of Toledo in 1085.70
The contemporaneous chronicle of the last Zirid King of Granada illustrates the
impact the tribute demands had on these city-states. In his biography, Las memorias de
‘Abd Allah, ultimo rey Ziri de Granda, detronado por los Almorávides (1090),71 Ibn
Buluggin explains how he paid Alfonso 50,000 meticales to stave off the invasion of
Granada.72 ‘Abd Allah, in his eye-witness account, later describes how Alfonso used the
same form of pressure to cause the fall of Toledo and force its Muslim leaders “into
misery.”73 According to the first-hand account of the Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez de
Rada, Alfonso’s siege of Toledo lasted seven years; during the last four of which he
systematically destroyed their fields and vineyards to force the city into Christian
hands.74 Alfonso had patiently planned the taking of Toledo and this acquisition would
reverberate in the chronicles of Muslim and Christian scribes for the next hundred
years.75

The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile, xxi.
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The helplessness of the taifa kingdoms before the growing strength of CastileLeón forced their hands, and they called upon the Almoravid for aid. The conquest of
Toledo made it clear to the remaining paria-paying taifa kings that it was only a matter of
time before they too would succumb to Alfonso. With this in mind, they called upon––
whether separately or together is of some debate––the Almoravid to come to their rescue.
The first to appeal for help was Yusuf, the king of Badajoz,76 and ‘Abd Allah of Granada
was quick to follow with a plea of his own. This was not an easy decision for these
independent kings. When warned by one of his ministers that he risked losing control of
his kingdom to their southern allies, the ruler of Seville, al-Mu’tamid Muhammad
(r. 1069-1095), famously stated that he would rather be a sheepherder than a pig farmer.77
This was presumably after his attempt to placate the Castilian king, by sending his
daughter to be Alfonso’s bride as a peace offering, had failed to stem the Christian
demands.78 She, according to Archbishop Rada, “fell hopelessly in love with Alfonso,”
converted to Christianity, and bore him a son as a result. Alfonso was also awarded the
castles of Caracuel, Alarcos, Consuegra, Mora, Ocaña, Oreja, Uclés, Huete, Amasatrigo,
and Cuenca, apparently as part of the dowry. 79 The constant pressure from Castile and

Huici, Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Almorávides,
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their lack of success staving off Christian advances forced the taifa kings to negotiate
with the Almoravid to come to their aid.
Why the Almoravid? How had they evolved to be powerful enough to afford an
adventure in al-Andalus? The Almoravid had united the Far Maghreb under one
leadership, which neither of the Umayyad nor Fatimids before them could. Because of
their strength, which will be evaluated shortly, the Almoravid were invited to al-Andalus
to help resist the northern advance. Through a series of emissaries and negotiations 80 the
Almoravid landed in Ceuta,81 and al-Andalus quickly realized the benefit of their
presence when they won the battle of Sagrajas (1086).82 Alfonso, buoyed by his
domination of the taifa states and the taking of Toledo the previous year (1085), had
intrepidly decided to take the field against much greater numbers. Before the battle, when
asked by the Almoravid ruler, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin (r. 1061-1106), if he would prefer to
submit to Islam rather than fight, Alfonso haughtily replied: “Such a letter as this! After
my father and I have taken tribute payments from the people of your religion for eighty
years!”83 This defeat surprised Alfonso, and Huici Miranda suggests that his troops,
accustomed to the weak response of the taifa armies, had chosen to enter this battle even
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though they were significantly outnumbered.84 The Berber victory not only signaled the
end to the taifa period, but the rise of the Almoravid in al-Andalus.
3.3 The Rise and Fall of the Almoravid (1040-1147)
The Almoravid were the first indigenous Berber tribe to consolidate the Maghreb.
The rise of the Almoravid can be traced to the renewal of the Sunna-Maliki Islamic belief
system, coupled with increased economic output from the Saharan trade routes. It is
difficult to separate the religious from the secular in this dynastic story as the religious,
military, and economic strategies all worked synergistically to build the Almoravid
kingdom. Abd Allah b. Yasin (?-1059), the founder of the Almoravid, was a Berber cleric
who had been recruited to be the Sanhaja’s imam, as their leadership knew that their
understanding of Islam was weak at best.85 Yasin had spent seven years in al-Andalus
where he was inculcated with the Maliki-Sunna school of Islam, but what is often
overlooked by historians, is that he also experienced the Umayyad bureaucratic machine,
even as it crumbled.86 He appears to have taken these lessons to heart as he established
the Almoravid state. Al-Bakri and Abi Zar both refer to the actions taken by Yasin as he
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instituted religious rigor amongst the Sanhaja and imposed the required Islamic taxes.87
Riwad al-Qirtas records it simply:
…then he taught them the Koran and the Islamic laws, he imposed upon them the
need to pray, the ten percent alms required, with which he constructed the
treasury, in which with the collected money he acquired soldiers, bought arms and
attacked the other tribes until they conquered the entire Saharan country,
aggregated the spoils of the dead and distributed it to the Almoravids.88
Yansin’s state-building instincts were apparent from the outset and the above
clearly verifies the marriage of religious cohesion and the building of a governing
framework. Religion played a significant role in the events which unfolded; however,
what is lost in many accounts is that this represented the first time that the Sanhaja Berber
tribes were taught Islam by one of their own, Ibn Yasin, and not by an Arab imam, who
historically would have treated them as second-class Muslims. Ibn Yasin created what
Ibn Khaldun had labeled asabiya, or “group feeling and cohesion,” within the tribes, in
part because he was a Berber speaking to Berbers. Uniting the tribes presented no mean
task. Ibn Hawqal (d. 978) in his Surat al-Ard (“Picture of the World”) asserts that: “The
Berbers of the Maghreb are divided into tribes of which the number cannot be counted
precisely and it is impossible to know all of them for their clans are too numerous and the
ramifications of their kin and tribes are too complicated, and also because they are
dispersed in the depth of the deserts.”89
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If Yasin provided the spiritual leadership with a state-building tendency, Yusuf
Ibn Tashfin (r. 1061-1106) was the technocrat who, although an outstanding leader in the
field, was also a skilled planner and builder. Over his forty-year reign he leveraged and
expanded the spiritual and state apparatus, fashioned by Yasin, to create a dynasty. 90
These were not “marauding nomads without a plan”; in 1070, eight years after taking
Sijilmasa, the Almoravid built one of the storied cities of the Maghreb, Marrakesh, and
this became their capital. 91 Ibn Tashfin, now fully in control of the Almoravid,
established Marrakesh as a base from which to manage his empire, and from here he sent
his warriors north to conquer Fez (1070), Tlemcen (1075), and al-Andalus (1090). What
the historiography lacks is the perspective that the Almoravid had accomplished what had
never been achieved before: they united the Sanhaja tribes and controlled the economy. It
was upon these two pillars that they built a state and sustained a dynasty. The
Almoravid’s rule appealed to the tribes of the Maghreb for three reasons: first, they
promised to limit taxes to those only authorized by God (previous regimes had imposed
taxes that were not authorized by Islamic law); second, they offered to wage war against
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the infidel; and third, they guaranteed distribution of the rewards. These three promises
would be echoed, in a varied form, by the Almohad.
These assurances could only be honored if the Almoravid could secure a source of
wealth to feed, equip, and pay an army. The Almoravid conquered the economic triangle
of southwestern Maghreb of Awdaghust (1054), Sijilmasa (1062),92 and Taghaza (1076),
dominated the gold, salt, and slave trade, and as result were able to construct a new state
and sustain a dynasty. Messier and Miller emphasize that to control salt meant to control
gold. They referred to this exchange as “The Saharan Trade Triangle”: manufactured
goods for salt; salt for gold; gold for manufactured goods.93 Even before the Almoravid
movement and the aggregation of tribes, the Sanhaja had dominated much of the salt
trade because of their control of the city of salt, Taghaza.94 The great travel-historian Ibn
Battuta (1352) explains its importance in his eye-witness account:
One of its marvels is that its houses and mosque are of rock salt and its roofs of
camel skins. It has no trees but is nothing but sand with a salt mine. They dig in
the earth for the salt, which is found in great slabs lying one upon the other as
though they have been shaped and placed underground. Nobody lives there except
the slaves of the Masufa who dig for the salt. …The Sudan use salt for currency
as gold and silver is used. They cut it into pieces and use it for their transactions.
Despite the meanness of the village of Taghaza they deal with qintar upon qintar
of gold there.95
The symbiotic relationship between gold and salt is further supported by an earlier
account conveyed by Ibn Hawqal (~ 977):
[The] king of Awdaghust maintains relations with the ruler of Ghana. Ghana is
the wealthiest king on the face of the earth because of his treasures and stock of
Corpus, 227.
Ibid., 109-110.
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gold extracted in olden times for his predecessors and himself. …They stand in
pressing need of good will of the kings of Awdaghust because of the salt which
comes to them from the lands of Islam. They cannot do without this salt, of which
one load … may fetch between 200 and 300 dinar. 96
One source goes so far as to report that gold could be traded on an equal weight-basis for
salt and even as much as two weights of gold to one weight of salt.97 Finally, salt
contributed a vital source of nourishment for the Almoravid camel herds, and these
“desert ships” provided the backbone upon which they maintained their caravan trade
routes and economic strength. 98
From this economic triangle, the Almoravid built and expanded their influence on
trade throughout the Maghreb and beyond: “…Under the Almoravid in the mid 1000’s,
Sijilmasa gold became the coin of the realm throughout the Maghrib, the Mashriq, and
Europe.”99 Numismatic studies reveal a rapid expansion of minted coins by the
Almoravid, who at one point had constructed seventeen mints, six in the Maghreb and
eleven in Spain.100 This dwarfs the single mint that existed in Qayrawan under the
Fatimids101 and can be favorably compared to the Islamic caliphate in Baghdad of Harun
al Rashid, who at the height of his administration had twenty mints.102 The impressive
output of gold currency continued through the reign of the first two caliphs and only
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declined as the Almohad began to disrupt the Almoravid dynasty in the Maghreb. 103
Bennison writes that the state functioned “as an extraction machine with a bureaucratic
apparatus geared towards gathering revenues, storing them, and disbursing a proportion
of them….The State’s primary role in the economy was tax or tribute collection, whether
direct or by means of land grants.”104
The Mediterranean commercial network between Spain, the Maghreb, and the
Mashriq existed before the rise of the Almoravid and their ascension to power did not
dampen this commerce.105 In fact, the Almoravid’s eventual control of the gold routes
allowed them to establish the murrabutin as the coin of the realm for the Maghreb, Iberia,
and much of the Mediterranean. The Geniza documents support this claim, as in one
letter an employee asks permission to make the circular trade of gold for perfume for silk.
He writes:
…the Kohen of Fasi sent to me a bar of gold from Fez with the notification that
he sold civet perfume for you for 7 ½ and 1/8 Andalusian mithqals. He asked me
to sell the gold in Almeria and to buy silk with the proceeds. 106
This letter, sent around 1110 at the height of the Almoravid reign, compliments five other
missives from the Letters of Medieval Traders by Goitein, that mention Almeria. Three
of these document the silk trade of some variety, indicating that silk production and
distribution was thriving.107 One such letter delineates four levels of silk quality,
indicating the maturity of this market. Silk and silk fabrics made up the majority of
Messier, “Analysis of Almoravid Dinars,” 113. Years are in Hegira.
Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires, 209.
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exported textiles and olive oil was the major food export of al-Andalus (zeit, oil in
Arabic, Azeite, in Spanish). Idrisi said that one could walk forty miles from Seville all
under the shade of olive trees. 108
Idrisi’s observation of olive oil production is linked to the important work of
Thomas Glick and his study of Islamic irrigation practices in al-Andalus. It was not, as he
points out, that irrigation did not exist in Iberia before the arrival of the Arab and Berber
conquerors; clearly it did. The innovation was the merchant class that implemented a
centrally controlled system, which not only increased the potential area of irrigation, but
also created a surplus so that they were able to accumulate wealth, increase trade, and
urbanize. This, coupled with the second wave of gold imports, helped al-Andalus and the
Maghreb maintain a long period of prosperity under the Almoravid.
The Almoravid eventually fell to the Almohad for four reasons. First, they were
fighting a war on two fronts––the Almohad in the Maghreb and the Christians in alAndalus. Second, these confrontations forced them to raise taxes, breaking one of their
original promises and damaging their legitimacy. Third, now in retreat, having lost
Toledo (1085) and Zaragoza (1118), the tax revenue and the flow of booty they had
promised their followers vanished. This led to revolts by the Berber masses in al-Andalus
and Christian sieges of Cordoba and Almeria (1146-1147), further eroding their
credibility and ensuring a negative cycle that eventually led to the invasion of the
Almohad.109 And finally, their last two young and experienced kings could not curb the
internal conflicts between tribes and left an opening for this competing tribal group. This
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should have served as a cautionary tale to the Almohad as three of these elements would
be repeated towards the end of their reign: reduced tax revenue from al-Andalus because
of loss of territory to Christian rivals; the succession of two teenage kings in the face of
these economic declines; and third, a rival tribal, in this case the Marinids, who would
take advantage of these weaknesses to sow dissent and mayhem.
3.4 Almoravid to Almohad Transition (1120-1147)
As he lay on his deathbed, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, the architect of the Almoravid
empire, provided his son with three imperatives to sustain control of the dynasty: first, do
not disturb the Masmuda tribes of the High Atlas mountains; second, maintain peace with
the Ibn Hud in al-Andalus, as they were a barrier between the Almoravid and the
Christians; and finally, treat the people of Cordoba well.110 His son, Ali Ibn Yusuf (r.
1084-1145), broke all three rules and this opened the door for the Almohad advance.
The Almoravid had established an indigenous ruling class, a strong economy, and
a bureaucratic infrastructure. Buresi argues that Yusuf b. Tashfin was able to construct
the first “post-tribal” model using military and religious authority to do so. 111 It was not
inevitable that the Berbers would come to rule the Maghreb; although in hindsight, the
idea that indigenous Berber rule would prevail should not come as a surprise, as they
were the majority population. Understanding that the Almoravid shaped the first
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consolidate power in the region, the question could legitimately be asked, why and how
did they succumb to the Almohad? The deterioration of their rule during their fourth
generation, was not as systematic as Khaldun’s formula. Clearly, the Almoravid no
longer represented the rough champions that had emerged from the desert and
consolidated the Maghreb; however, they had dominated the gold caravan routes and
conquered al-Andalus. They now ruled an empire from their sedentary base in Marrakech
and with these triumphs came additional pressures. Two of the main tenets for their
continued success were, first, to be seen as jihadists against the infidel; and second, to be
responsible fiscal leaders that would maintain equitable taxes.112 These proved to be
symbiotic objectives; as long as territory was being conquered, armies would be satisfied
with their share of the spoils and taxes could be equitably maintained.
As his father before him, Ali Ibn Yusuf had put much store in fighting the
Christians in al-Andalus.113 The subsequent losses of Toledo and Saragossa indicated a
change of momentum for the Almoravid in Iberia. The famous fifteen-month incursion
(1125-1126) of Alfonso I of Aragon (The Battler) into Andalusian territory, raiding and
terrorizing Granada, Valencia, Alcira, Denia, Murcia, Baza, Guadix, represented another
example of this momentum shift and Almoravid weakness.114 A certain contingent of
Muwallad Christians and Jews from this territory had joined Alfonso’s cause and this
only served to make the Almoravid paranoid, stricter, and as a result, less popular. A
portentous coincidence occurred, for as fate would have it, Alfonso’s raid in al-Andalus
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coincided with the beginning of the Almohad revolt in the Maghreb in the same year,
when they descended from the Atlas to begin their rebellion.115
Forced to increase taxes to defend their territory, the Almoravid rescinded one of
the fundamental planks of their rise to power. This, coupled with employing numerous
Christian soldiers to fight the Almohad in the Maghreb, frayed the very cloth of their
authority as rulers. This weakened legitimacy, substantiated by rebellions of Muwallad in
both the Algarve and Cordoba, who revolted in part because of their discontent with the
Almoravid’s lack of response to Christian aggression, played into the Almohad hands.116
The most famous rebel, the Sufi religious leader Ibn Qasim, the governor of Silves,
coordinated his uprising with the Almohad and eventually converted to their
movement.117 But it was not only the loss of Toledo and Zaragoza that were fatal to the
Almoravid; perhaps they would have been able to regroup in al-Andalus. The rise of the
Masmuda tribe, the Almohad, the second of the deathbed-warnings Ibn Tashfin had given
his son, would spell the end for the Almoravid.118
The Almohad, during the period of Ibn Tumart (r. 1120-1130), had conducted
numerous raids that threatened, but did not overthrow, the Almoravid. These threats led
the Almoravid to invest over 70,000 gold dinars to build a defensive wall around their
capital, Marrakech.119 With the aid of this wall, the Almoravid were able to resist the
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Almohad at the battle of Buyhara (1130), where 100,000 Almohad laid siege to
Marrakech for forty days. This resulted in a total disaster, for al Hulal reports that over
40,000 Almohad perished when the Almoravid sallied forth from their stronghold to
punish them and push them back to their base at Tinmal.120 The words of advisors who
had warned of the Almohad mahdi must have been ringing in the ears of the Almoravid
caliph, Ali Ibn Yusuf: “put this man, Ibn Tumart, in a room of steel or if you don’t, you
will spend a room of gold against him.”121
Ibn Tumart would soon pass away, and after three years Abd al-Mu’min would
emerge as the leader of the Almohad. This was not a foregone conclusion, as Ibn
Tumart’s two brothers initially resisted; Abd al-Mu’min came from one of the minority,
non-Masmuda tribes of the assembled group, and had many internal competitors for his
position. In the end, Abd al-Mu’min did prevail, and ten years after the death of the
mahdi, he decided to pursue a more prudent military strategy. Instead of attacking the
Almoravid capital of Marrakech, he began a campaign against the Almoravid’s weaker
territories: the foothills of the Sus and the Atlas mountains, between Marrakech, Fez, and
the northern coast.122 In 1140-41, he called upon his own tribe, the Kumiya, and the
larger Zenata group of the northern Maghreb, to help combat the Almoravid in what was
called the “campaign of seven years” (1140-1147).123 The addition of the northern tribes
was critical to his success but also introduced another source of power within the
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Almohad. During the seven-year war Abd al-Mu’min skirted the eastern flank of the
Atlas mountains in areas such as Garis, Todga, and the valley of Ziz, avoiding the
strongholds of the Almoravid, while continuing to gain momentum. 124 Through this
offensive the Almohad threatened the northern trade routes that were outside the control
of the nodal-city strongholds.
The Almohad had finally reached the sea at Oran and their continuous skirmishes
had threatened the Almoravid to the point that their recently ascended king, Ishaq Ibn
Tashfin (r.1143-1145), decided to confront them himself. This led to the final siege at
Oran in which Ibn Tashfin was forced to flee, and in an attempt to escape he was
captured and killed, leaving the majority of his troops to perish from thirst in Oran.125 Ibn
Tashfin’s death led to an internal struggle for power among the two dominant Almoravid
tribes: the Lamtuna and the Masufa. 126 “It was during this period that many of the
Lamtuna and Masufa tribes fought amongst themselves; prices rose, and hunger invaded
the country, while the tax base diminished because of this rebellion.” 127 Abd al-Mu’min
took advantage of this internal strife and the northern and central Maghreb was now
under his control, as the major tribes and all the irregular troops ceded to his authority.128
The result of the death of Ibn Tashfin and Abd al-Mu’min’s victory fomented the
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outbreak of an Almoravid civil war, in which many of the important sheikhs of the
Almoravid, undoubtedly seeing the writing on the wall, defected to the Almohad, adding
momentum to their gains in the northern Maghreb.129
Two puerile caliphs succeeded Tashfin, the last of which, Ishaq ibn Ali (r. 1147),
was executed by the Almohad when they conquered Marrakech in 1147.130 The
Almoravid proved unable to withstand the combination of conducting a war on two fronts
and a transition of power to two consecutive infant kings. This proved to be a
premonition of what was to come for the more organized and powerful Almohad dynasty.
Figure 1. Area of Almohad Expansion
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3.5 Christian Iberia: Between the Innocents
3.5.1 Castile and Portugal
The period of the Almohad’s occupation of Spain (1147-1228) might be easily
labelled “Between the Innocents,” as the papacies of Innocent II (1130-1143) and
Innocent III (1198-1216) bookended it and marked an increased involvement of Rome in
the political affairs of the peninsula. In fact, directly preceding this period, Alfonso VI, in
an attempt to curry favor with Rome, had abandoned the Visigothic/Mozarabic rites in
1080, and introduced the Latin liturgy under the auspices of Cluniac monks. 132 This papal
involvement shaped a two-way affair driven on the one hand by the Iberian monarchs’
avidity for papal approval as a sign of legitimacy of their rule, and on the other hand,
Rome’s concern for the increased vitality of Islam. Alfonso VII and Alfonso VIII of
Castile, as consecutive rulers of one of the more stable kingdoms in Iberia, longed to be
recognized as the emperors of Spain by Rome, even while they were often respected by
their fellow monarchs as primus inter pares.
It is impossible to separate the analysis the Almohad empire from al-Andalus, for
this possession had the most potential for wealth and contained the most formidable
threats to their existence. One can contemplate that had the Almohad been content to
control the Maghreb, and sated their empire ambitions with campaigns to Ifriqiya and
further east, they may have maintained their rule for a longer period of time. But this
would not be the case. They looked northward, as would the Marinids after them, and
Amira K. Bennison, “Liminal States: Morocco and the Iberian Frontier Between the Twelfth and
Nineteenth Centuries,” in North African Islam and the Mediterranean World, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 16. Aragon would do the same in 1071.
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aspired to control the rich, expansive lands of al-Andalus. This passage by Abd al-Wahid
provides an idyllic description of al-Andalus long held by the invading Berbers:
It is the East of the suns of science and its moons are the center of its merits and
the axis of its sphere. It is the country with the most temperate climate and the
purest air; and the sweetest water and the most aromatic plants; and it is graced
with soft mornings and afternoons. 133
With the Almohad goals of expansion in mind, it is critical to understand the northern
Christian kingdoms’ responses to their occupation of al-Andalus.
In his España del Cid 134 Menendez Pidal argues, not unlike Alborñoz, for an
eternal Spain, a Spain that existed from the time of the Visigoths and that “reunited the
farthest province of Imperial Rome, and is the first political expression of the new idea of
Spain.”135 Menendez Pidal notes that Castile of the thirteenth century had the clearest
understanding of this vision.136 In Menendez Pidal’s view, Spain’s history reached back
to Alfonso III el Magno (866-910) who, as King of León, Galicia, and Pamplona, was
revered by his subjects as “Imperator Nostro.”137 However, the assertion of an eternal
Spain can seem puzzling when one reads of the splintering of the empire by Sancho the
Great (r. 1000-1035), who at the end of his reign divided his kingdom into three realms to
placate his offspring: Fernando I (r. 1037-1065) would gain León-Castile; Garcia
Sanchez (r. 1035-1054) would obtain Navarre; and Ramiro I (r. 1035-1063) would be
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awarded Aragon. The subsequent creation of Portugal by the energetic Alfonso I (r.
1128-1185), and the marriage of Petronilla of Aragon (r. 1137-1164) to Berenguer IV of
Catalonia (r. 1131-1162) in 1131, which produced the greater Aragonese kingdom, added
to the previously mentioned three monarchies.
While each had its own history and politics, the northern Christian polities existed
in a milieu of intertwined blood, marriage, and heritage. The relationships, while at times
cooperative, often remained typified by jealousy and double dealing. The kingdoms were
as interested in expanding their territories at the expense of the Islamic kingdom(s) to the
south, as they were in usurping land from their Christian neighbors, as witnessed by the
division of Navarra by Castile and Aragon until Garcia “The Restorer” was named king
in 1134. Castile, throughout the thirteenth century and beyond, maintained a vision of a
united Spain, but typically this occurred at the expense of their co-religionists, who
understandably did not share this vision with equal enthusiasm.
The division of Sancho the Great’s kingdom in 1035 coincided with the founding
of the Almoravid empire (1040). These divisions in many ways played into the hands of
the invading Berber dynasties, as the shifting alliances allowed the Berbers to leverage
one Christian kingdom off of the other. The Almohad would lose the advantage of their
divide and conquer strategy during the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa campaign in 1212
because of the Christian kingdoms’ cooperation. However, during the initial invasion of
the Almoravid (1085) the five principalities of Portugal, Aragon, Catalonia, Navarre, and
Leon-Castile were hardly aligned.138
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A consistent condition throughout the period of the Berber invasions was the
internecine warfare of the northern kingdoms and the many treaties and alliances that
they conceded to their southern neighbors, in particular with the Almohad. In addition to
these treaties with the Muslims, they would often absent themselves from battle alongside
their coreligionists, even if they had previously agreed to participate. After his defeat at
Sagrajas (1086) and in his subsequent escape to Toledo, Alfonso VI (r. 1065-1109) called
for help from Pedro I of Aragon and the famous Rodrigo de Vivar, El Cid, for fear of the
continued advance of the Almoravid. Neither Pedro nor Cid would appear. Fortunately
for Alfonso, a combination of pressing matters in the Maghreb, coupled with what
assuredly would have been a long siege of Toledo, convinced Ibn Tashfin and the
Almoravid to return to Seville.139 Similarly, a hundred years later, the failure of
reinforcements from León and Navarre to materialize in time to aid Alfonso VIII of
Castile (r. 1158-1213) would lead to the defeat of Christian forces at Los Alarcos
(1195).140
Alfonso IX of León (r. 1188-1230) had purposefully abandoned his cousin,
Alfonso VIII of Castile, at Alarcos because he had reneged on an agreement to cede
control to certain castles; however, this only provides part of the history between these
two monarchs. Their relationship was fraught with agitation, stemming from the
embarrassing denigration that Alfonso IX experienced at the hands of his older cousin,
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Alfonso VIII, when forced to kiss his ring at Carrión and recognize his superiority. 141 The
author of the Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile leaves little to the imagination:
Meanwhile the king of León who was coming to the aid of the king of Castile
came to Toledo; but on the advice of certain agents of Satan, he turned into a
crooked bow and looked for reasons to abandon his friend. Once a friend, he now
became the cruelest enemy. For he kept in the back of his mind what had
happened to him in the curia celebrated at Carrión mentioned above. Pleased and
rejoicing over the misfortune that had befallen the Castilians, he withdrew from
Toledo, indignant with the glorious king because he had not given him certain
castles he had demanded. He immediately allied himself with the king of
Morocco, accepting money and a host of armed knights from him and made war
upon the king of Castile.142
This meeting between the kings which pushed Alfonso IX into the arms of the
“agents of Satan” preceded the Battle of Alarcos (1195), which would be the first major
victory of the Almohad in al-Andalus. The Almohad would hail this triumph as an
achievement greater than that of the Almoravid victory at Sagrajas, which not only
emphasizes its significance, but also demonstrates that these large, open-field encounters
remained in the collective memory on both sides of the divide for extended periods.
Alfonso IX would subsequently use the loss of Alarcos as an excuse to invade Castile
with the help of his Almohad allies. 143
3.5.2 The Iberian Levant
The dynastic dynamics in the eastern peninsula proved to be just as complicated
and arguably even more entwined with Rome. Alfonso I the Battler (r. 1104-1134) had

The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile, 22.
Ibid., 28.
143 Ibid. This was not the first time that Alfonso IX had combined forces with the Almohad against his coreligionists. He had also come to the defense of the Muslims during the siege of Badajoz (1147), allying
himself with Abd al-Mu'min against Alfonso I of Portugal. 143 Ibn Sahib al-Sala, Al-Mann Bil-Imama, trans.
Ambrosio Huici Miranda (Valencia: Anubar, 1968), 144.
141
142

52

invaded al-Andalus in 1125, which led to further conflict with Almoravid and aided in
their eventual demise. Critical to Alfonso’s invasion was that it encouraged elements of
the Muwallad and Jewish community to rebel, which left a permanent stain of suspicion
of these communities in the minds of their Almoravid and Almohad conquerors, and in
part led to the requirement of conversion or exile for many Jewish and Muwallad
Christian subjects.144
Alfonso, upon his death, left Aragon to Rome, the Templars, and The Knights of
St. John of Jerusalem.145 This endowment was the result of the failed attempt to unite
Castile and Aragon by the marriage to his cousin, Urraca (r. 1109-1126), the only
surviving child of Alfonso VI of Castile. She had produced a son, Alfonso (later to
become Alfonso VII of Leon-Castile), by her first marriage to Raymond of Burgundy,
but when Raymond died, she was forced by her father, Alfonso VI, to marry Alfonso I in
the failed pursuit of a Castile-León and Aragon union. She had resisted this pairing from
the outset, and their notoriously contentious marriage ended with no issue in 1110.
Politics put asunder what the papacy could not; their personalities and dynastic views
proved incompatible and convinced them both to leave the union, something the
admonishment of the church, for reasons of consanguinity, was unable to do.146 As a
result of his failed marriage to Urraca, coupled with his inability to produce an heir,
Alfonso I willed his kingdom to the church and the Templars to keep Aragon out of the
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ever-ready hands of his ex-wife and her son Alfonso VII of Leon-Castile (r. 1126-1157).
The bequeathing of the kingdom of Aragon to the church caused great consternation
among the nobles of the realm and even the papacy understood that this was not a
workable solution. Lourie argues convincingly that Alfonso not only misled many
historians but the papacy as well, and only ceded his kingdom to the Roman See to
stymie Alfonso VII of Castile-Leon’s designs long enough for his brother Ramiro II
(r.1134-1157) to sire an heir.147 The church and the nobles understood that Alfonso’s will
was an unworkable solution and Ramiro II was called out of mothballs in the monastery
to become king of Aragon. This monk-king’s two major accomplishments were to
reinstate the kingdom of Aragon and produce an heir, Petronilla (r. 1137-1164).
Petronilla would eventually wed Ramon Berenguer IV (r. 1131-1162) of Catalonia, to
create the combined kingdom of Catalonia-Aragon, the joining of which created one of
the strongest oppositions to the Islamic kingdoms. Subsequent negotiation with the
church and the Templars required Ramon IV to compensate the military and religious
orders for losing their inheritance from Alfonso in order to smooth the path for the union
with Aragon. Meanwhile, the Navarrese seized this opportunity to separate from Aragon,
and installed as their king, Garcia “the Restorer” (r. 1134-1150), the bastard son of a
Navarrese nobleman.148 Both kingdoms, weakened by these transitions, were forced to
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render vassalage to Castile-Leon in order to regain territory held hostage by Alfonso VII
in return for this recognition.149
Having declined the rights to the kingdom of Aragon, papal intervention would
become more proactive as Innocent III (1198-1216) forbade Ramiro II’s grandson, Pedro
II (r. 1196-1213), to divorce Marie of Montpellier.150 More importantly, after Pedro II’s
ignoble defeat and premature death at Muret in 1213, Innocent saved the offspring of this
marriage, Jaime I. Jaime I’s mother had died the same year as Pedro’s defeat, and the heir
apparent to the crown of Aragon, under complicated circumstances, had been left in the
hands of the victor of Muret, Simon de Montfort (1175-121). Innocent III sent his right
hand, Cardinal Peter Collivaccina of Benevento, 151 to insist that Montfort hand over
Jaime or face the consequences. Cardinal Collivaccina adeptly managed the minority of
Jaime I (r. 1213-1276),152 and it was in this period that Innocent III, through his emissary
Collivaccina, strong-armed the Aragonese and Catalonian elites to recognize Jaime and
sign a set of agreements that held firm throughout his minority.153
The above is an example of papal intervention and proof that the influence of
Rome, while not complete, was ever-present in Iberia. The Catholic monarchs of this
period felt compelled to court Rome for legitimacy and aid when necessary. The example
of Jaime I best represents the political intervention by Rome that ended, if Jaime I’s
dynastic results are taken as proof, in a success. However, many examples of the
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monarchs ignoring the church’s advice when these demands did not suit their political or
familial needs are recorded. Innocent successfully denied the marriage of Berenguela of
Castile (1180-1246) and Alfonso IX of Leon (1188-1230) based on their third degree of
consanguinity,154 as he had, on similar grounds, prohibited the marriage between the
sister of King Sancho VII of Navarre (1194-1234) and Peter II of Aragon.155 However,
there continued to be cases in which marriages persisted with no regard for papal
restrictions; the example of Urraca and Alfonso I described above was one such example.
As first cousins, Alfonso VIII of Castile, Alfonso IX of Leon, Sancho VII of
Navarre, and Peter II of Aragon knew each other well and understood their respective
desires for power, legitimacy, and territory. This intercalated world of family competition
would continue for two centuries beyond the period of the Almohad, until the marriage of
the Catholic Kings (1469), and even then territorial disagreements and competition would
persist. These contentious relationships created opportunities for treaties on both sides of
the religious divide and were acted upon by all parties in the peninsula.
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Figure 1. The Kingdoms of Spain During the Almohad Reign of al-Andalus 156

3.5.3 Almoravid Holdouts
The Iberian Levant did not only contain the Christian kingdoms of Navarra,
Aragon, and Catalonia. Two Almoravid kingdoms that resisted the Almohad most
fiercely were those of Murcia under Ibn Mardanis (r. 1147-1172) and the Ibn Ghaniya of
the Balearics. Both kingdoms would conduct economic, political, and military triage to
avoid Almohad dominance, signing commercial agreements with the Genoese and
arranging military-political accords with their Christian neighbors whenever possible and
convenient. Both had active ports, and while they were not as prominent as Almeria,
Denia, Valencia, and Palma, all conducted active trade in the Mediterranean.157
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Ibn Mardanis, El Rey Lobo (The Wolf King), a Muwallad whose family was
believed to have converted to Islam in the tenth century,158 used his military and political
skills to create alliances with whichever northern Christian kingdom was most receptive
to help him resist the advance of the Almohad, which he accomplished for over twentyfive years.159 In essence, Ibn Mardanis maintained a taifa relationship with the North and
he repeatedly paid to maintain his borders and sovereignty. 160
Figure 2. Territory of Ibn Mardanis in al-Andalus 161
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He controlled his economy through the gold, silk, and olive oil trade conducted in
the active ports of Denia and Valencia. In spite of the Genoese relationship with the
Almohad, Ibn Mardanis signed a ten-year trade agreement with this Italian city-state in
1149, which was renewed in 1161.162 He resisted the Almohad advances over the course
of his reign and only upon his death (1172) did his heirs agreed to recognize the
Almohad. The addition of Ibn Mardanis’ holdings expanded the Almohad realms in alAndalus substantially and after his death there was neither buffer nor reason to deter open
conflict between the northern Christian kingdoms and the Almohad.163
Muhamad b. ‘Ali Ghaniya (r. 1126-1165), the original governor of the Balearics,
descended from the Almoravid leader Ali ibn Yusuf. 164 Similar to Mardanis, the
Balearics had an economic base, coupled with their obvious physical barriers, that
allowed them to maintain their autonomy for longer than any territory of the previous
Almoravid Empire. Their strategic location in the Mediterranean secured their economic
independence and in 1181 they were able to sign a treaty with the Genoese for commerce
and safe-conduct, which was renewed in 1188. 165
The Banu Ghaniya, tenacious warriors in their own right, would rule the Balearics
uninterrupted except for a brief period (1184-1187), until they were finally conquered by
the Almohad in 1203. Additionally, through contacts developed with the Arab tribes in
North Africa, they attacked Ifriqiya and controlled most of what is modern day Tunisia
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by 1187.166 The Almohad reconquered Tunis in 1188 and the Ibn Ghaniya retreated
south. When the Almohad caliph Abu Yusuf died in 1199, the Ibn Ghaniya rose again,
only to have their movement permanently squashed in 1206 by the Almohad regional
viceroy, Abdul Wahid. Abdul Wahid was the son of Abu Hafs ‘Umar from the Hintata
tribe, who was one of the original ten companions of Ibn Tumart, and he not only crushed
the revolt, but his offspring would found the Hafsid dynasty (1229-1574).
3.6 Did the Crusades Affect the Almohad?
Urban II’s call for the first crusade in 1095 came only ten years after the
Almoravid victory at Sagrajas, and during the Almohad dynasty’s control of al-Andalus
(1147-1228) three additional eastern crusades would transpire (1147-1150; 1189-1192;
1202-1204). In the latter two, Spain received papal dispensation of sins and the Iberians
were encouraged to remain in the peninsula to fight the infidel. Urban II’s view of
crusading was altered after the Almoravid invasion, and he recognized the inefficiency of
sending Iberians to the Holy Land when Spain was under assault by Islam.
If anyone of you, therefore, plans to go to Asia, let him try to fulfill the desire of
his devotion here [Iberia]. For there is no virtue in delivering Christians from
Saracens there while exposing Christians here to the tyranny and oppression of
Saracens.167
The emphasis on crusades may have been brought about by the entrance of the Cluniacs
into Iberia in the second half of the eleventh century, 168 and they possibly influenced the
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Christian kings’ adherence to the pope’s advice. After the first crusade, Alfonso VII of
Leon-Castile and Alfonso I of Aragon proclaimed their intentions to fight the holy war in
Spain and be obedient to Innocent II. 169
However, the crusades should be viewed through an Iberian lens, as few of the
Christians or Muslims kingdoms in this region demonstrated ambition to regain or
maintain the holy land. It should be argued that the Almoravid and Almohad invasions
had more of an influence on the crusading mentality of the church than on the Iberian
monarchs; however, these kings would take advantage of papal crusading fervor to gain
dispensation and assistance when possible. This provides an example where the churches’
desires and the Iberian monarchs’ needs were in concordance. O’Callaghan argues that in
the eyes of the Christian monarchs the Reconquista was not a war of conquest, but a war
of repossession. The idea of converting Muslims to Christianity proved much more of a
Northern European ideal than that of the peninsular Christians, whose major concern, in
particular during the time of the Almohad, remained regaining territory and a tax base,
rather than defending Christendom.170
Contemporary Iberian historians make little mention of the crusades in the
primary documents. The Almohad were aware of the campaigns in the East, but they
remained focused on conquest opportunities closer to home. In the instance mentioned by
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the sources in which the Almohad were given the opportunity to provide aid for the most
famous Islamic defender against Christendom, Saladin, they demurred. In 1190 Saladin
had sent a minister to Marrakech to request ships to resist the crusaders. The Almohad
were gracious in their reception of Saladin’s ambassadors, but their hospitality, praise,
and gifts did not result in military support.171 In fact, there is some evidence that Saladin
and the Almohad may have viewed each other as rivals in the region, and perhaps the
Almohad decided not to arm a potential competitor for Ifriqiya.172
To summarize the historical background, it is critical to understand that the
Almohad had seven entities with which they had to fight, compromise, and negotiate. AlAndalus, Ibn Madarnis, the Balearics, Ifriqiya, Portugal, Leon, Castile, Navarre, and
Aragon/Catalonia represented competitors for territory within their realm. They battled
and negotiated with all of them with varying success and once Ibn Mardanis fell in 1172,
the Balearics in 1203, and Ifriqiya in 1206, the field was clear for the Almohad to face
their Christian competitors which would lead to the fateful Battle of Las Navas de
Tolosa.
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Chapter 4 The Almohad
4.1 Thesis Introduction: The Rise and Fall of the Strangers
Ibn Khaldun concluded that dynasties began their decline by the fourth
generation. Reportedly, he modeled the Almoravid and Almohad for this thesis, and it
proved accurate that in both cases, material deterioration to their empires can be traced to
the third and fourth generations of these Berber kingdoms. The three medieval kingdoms
of the Maghreb, the Almoravid, the Almohad, and the Marinid, lasted 100, 150, and 250
years respectively, each building on the foundation of the other. Consistent with other
medieval polities, they proved unable to make the transition from relationship politics
and family-based dynasties to what would later be recognized as a state; this would not
exist in the Maghreb for another 400 years, until the advent of the Alouite dynasty (1631present).
Five potential fault lines of their rule must have been apparent to the Almohad
leadership, and if not to them, with the clear view of hindsight, are apparent to history.
First, they recognized the mercenary nature of the Arab tribes, a key component of their
military. Second, they knew that a significant amount of population within their realms
were Mawallad and Jews. These elements could potentially aid a revolt as they had in
joining Alfonso I in his extended raid of 1125, or who had rebelled against the Almoravid
on the side of the Almohad themselves. The opposing tribes within the Maghreb
represented a third element of risk to their empire. Many non-Masmuda tribes had joined
their cause, but this opportunistic loyalty remained contingent on the expansion of
territory with the promise of remuneration and booty. A fourth challenge, the Maliki
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ulema in al-Andalus, resisted the Almohad philosophy as it represented a direct affront to
their Sunna school of Islam. While the initial Almohad reforms may have softened over
time and distance as they crossed the strait, the 400 years of Maliki Sunna infrastructure
of jurist and ulema did not disappear upon the Almohad arrival to Iberia. And finally, the
inter-dynastic struggles from brothers, uncles, and cousins lingered as a constant threat to
stability and will be discussed below.
These groups could be held together with a strong fiscal discipline that would pay
for armies and satisfy disparate political entities critical for the long-term success of the
Almohad. However, all the emulsifying elements of culture and philosophy combined
could not overcome a weak economy, especially when coupled with an unexplainable
military loss and weak leadership. During the period of the first three caliphs territorial
expansion and fiscal incentives allowed the Almohad to suppress rebellions and satisfy
potential disruptive elements, such as the Arab tribes. Once expansion was reversed, in
particular losing their grip on al-Andalus, dissatisfied elements, such as the Zenata, began
to rebel. A faltering economy opened the door for these rebellions and the infrastructure
they built, described below, would not be sufficient to maintain the Almohad in power.
4.2 Was There a Medieval State? Did the Almohad Create One?
A state, as described by modern historians, is a polity that provides institutions
that ensure order and aid citizens in a sovereign territory to live their everyday lives.
These institutions levy taxes to provide justice, internal and external protection, and
employ state resources to redistribute wealth to their supporters. This of course, is an
academic description and Strayer and Anderson remind us that a state “exists chiefly in
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the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise
will bring it to life.”173 The Almohad understood that belief in their leadership would
preserve their success and they went to great lengths to create and sustain confidence in
their rule.
Joseph Strayer, in his On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, believes that
the ultimate test for state building was whether a dynasty could “shift loyalty from
family, local community, or religious organization to the state, and the acquisition of a
moral authority to back up its institutional structure and its theoretical legal
supremacy.”174At its highest form, a state builds impersonal institutions that once created
can survive a change of power. Ibn Khaldun does describe a concept of asibiya, or group
feeling, that could transcend one tribe; however, the idea of an impersonal institution
would have been foreign in this period, as personal-relationship politics prevailed, and
much of what could be considered the “executive branch” of government remained in
constant movement throughout the kingdom.
Before the Almohad, the Almoravid did attempt to create asibiya, a group feeling,
and a community that superseded the local clan. They had assembled the Sanhaja tribes
and through the power of this aggregation had conquered the Maghreb and al-Andalus.
The Almoravid relied on the Andalusian Maliki religious school of Islam, coupled with
the control of the sub-Saharan trade network, to further their legitimacy. They exploited
the excess wealth created by this network to expand their control in the Maghreb and
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invade al-Andalus. They organized the first proto-state in the Maghreb that included a tax
regime and philosophy, a judicial framework, and a provisional army that conquered the
Maghreb and al-Andalus, and subdued all internal enemies. This represented a clear
structural and dynastic roadmap for the Almohad to follow.
The Almohad attempted to construct a state but ultimately failed for three reasons.
First, despite the infrastructure they had established, they proved unable to overcome
their subjects’ deep tribal culture, in particular when their organization was stress-tested
by their northern foes. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Almohad not only
attempted to aggregate the tribes of the Masmuda, but they further complicated their task
by adding two other tribal elements, the Zenata and the Arabs. Second, their northern
competitors for geographic, human, and economic resources had matured and materially
changed their strategies from one hundred years earlier. And third, and most important,
their economic resources, stretched across five geographies and under threat,175 proved
unable to hold an empire intact.
Ultimately, their supporters’ belief in the caliphate, an important pillar in a stable
state as stressed by Strayer, evaporated with losses in the field under weak leadership and
an economy which began to falter. With this as background, this paper will review how
the Almohad came to power, what institutions they built, and analyze why, with
seemingly many of the proper elements for a stable state in place and at the height of
their power, they would decline at such a precipitous rate.

175

Central Maghreb; Southern Maghreb, Ifriqiya, the Balearics, and al-Andalus.

66

4.3 Religion and Culture
The Almohad created an intercalated religious, political, social, and military
campaign that produced a like-minded community, and eventually an empire. The
Almohad succeeded in bringing these elements to bear against the populations of the
Maghreb and al-Andalus, and at the height of their power they controlled the Maghreb,
Ifriqiya, and al-Andalus. They also defeated and coopted the Hilalie and Salaym Arab
tribes and eliminated their two strongest regional competitors, Ibn Mardanis in the Levant
of Iberia (1172) and the Ibn Ghaniya (1203) in the Balearics.
4.3.1 Develop a Philosophy; Almohad Tawhid
No monolithic Islamic religion existed at the time of the rise of the Almohad, and
many currents of religious dissent were stirring throughout the Mashriq, Ifriqiya, and the
Maghreb. The Almoravid had coopted one of the four Sunna schools of Islam, Malikism,
from al-Andalus as a source of their own religious legitimacy. The Fatimids and their
Shiite followers, on the other hand, had been in the Maghreb since 893, and by 909 they,
and their Kutama-tribe followers, had replaced the Aghlabids as the leaders of Ifriqiya.176
Whereas they would eventually move their capital to al Fustat (969), their influence had
not evaporated by the time of the arrival of the Almohad. Finally, the Kharijites, whose
existence predated the Sunna-Shia split, were also present in the Maghreb, and held
particular appeal for the Berbers, as one of their basic tenets ensured that the caliph need
not be a descendant of the Quaraysh tribe; this allowed Berbers the opportunity to

176

Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 60-61.

67

participate as leaders of their own religion. 177 Ibn Tumart created a syncretic mix of
Sunna, Shiite, and Kharijite practices that fit a strict version of his own beliefs, and that
could effectively be contrasted with the Almoravid Maliki school.
Whereas there was a mixture of religious practices that Ibn Tumart drew from, no
influence proved stronger on the philosophy of the Almohad than al-Ghazali.178 AlGhazali emerged from the Sunna school of Islam and his most influential teaching was
the concept of tawhid. Tawhid described God as “in all eternity, the only one to possess
uniqueness, domination and divinity.”179 God was not created and he had no human
characteristics. The latter element proved to be the theological wedge that Ibn Tumart
utilized to attack the Almoravid; he referred to his attack as anti-anthropomorphism. His
argument stated that by anthropomorphizing God the Almoravid transformed him into a
corporeal being, and hence an idol. 180 The Almoravid theology interpreted aspects of the
Quran that mentioned God exercising human-like behavior, such as “descending and
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sitting on the throne,” as literal actions taken by God. “Ibn Tumart was not making a
technical point, but emphasizing the fundamental basis of humanity’s relationship with
God. God was not at a place, in a location, or part of something; God ‘existed before
places and locations’.”181
Ibn Tumart’s reaction demonstrated a backlash against the alfaquis of the Maliki
school of al-Andalus. In his view, they had devolved into lawyers and jurists with more
interest in adjudicating parochial secular matters as opposed to his emphasis on
understanding and interpreting the original hadith or the Quran and the mystic truths and
vivification preached by al-Ghazali.182 It is true that the Maliki school of al-Andalus,
integrated into the framework for governing, had developed a form of statutory practice
that could be argued was sectarian, more like legal code, and divorced from the original
sources of the Quran and the hadith.183 Ibn Tumart was interested in understanding and
belief, not legal precedent.
Cornell makes the compelling case that Ibn Tumart was a “systematizer not a
philosopher,” and that he merely attempted to communicate the clearest path to the truth.
He wanted only knowledge (‘ilm) to lead his followers to truth; knowing that ignorance
(jahl), doubt (shakk), and opinion (zann), provided the quickest paths to error.184
Tumart’s theory was not necessarily radical in its thinking. The Almohad felt comfortable
with the idea that logic could bring their believers to the correct understanding of God.
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Fletcher underscores that Tumart believed that one could reach the correct conclusion
regarding the oneness of God through reason, thus legitimizing the study of science and
philosophy.185 The Almohad sponsored some of the leading thinkers of the period and
created an environment for the creation of Averroes’ Ibn Yaqzan and Moises
Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed; the latter was recognized as a of the great thinkers
of medieval times and one of the guides to Aquinas when he navigated Aristotelian and
Christian thought.186
Ibn Tumart asked his followers to “enjoin good and forbid evil.” As banal as this
mantra appears, it had a history of use in Islam as a justification for opposing tyranny.
Let there arise out of you a band
Of people inviting to all that is good,
Enjoining what is right,
And forbidding what is wrong.
They are the ones to attain felicity.
Be not like those who are divided
Amongst themselves
And fall into disputations
After receiving clear signs.
For them is a dreadful penalty. 187
There remains no doubt that Ibn Tumart should be considered a true believer and
charismatic preacher, and by creating a new religion he augmented a unique sense of
asibiya among his burgeoning followers. Numerous first-hand accounts exists of him
accosting worshippers in the street or political leaders for demonstrations of what he
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deemed to be irreligious acts.188 The most famous and daring of these occurred when he
challenged the Almoravid caliph Ali Ibn Yusuf (r.1084-1143) in Marrakech during
Friday prayers. The story relates how Ibn Tumart entered the mosque for Friday prayers
and knelt in the place typically reserved for the caliph. “The guardians of the mosque
interrupted his prayers, saying: ‘This place is reserved for the prince of the Muslims.’ Ibn
Tumart replied, ‘Places of worship [mosques] are for God [alone].’” 189 When the caliph
appeared, he spoke to Ibn Tumart, who ignored him until he, Tumart, had finished his
prayers.190 A second account of similar renown, records when Ibn Tumart was summoned
to the court of Ali Ibn Yusuf. The Almoravid men were famous for wearing veils to cover
their faces; an obscure rationale for this existed, but nothing in the Quran supported this
practice. Upon being presented to the amir Ibn Tumart replied, “Where is the Amir? I see
[only] slave-girls!” With this Ali Ibn Yusuf lifted the veil from his face and
acknowledged Ibn Tumart’s remark. Not feeling like he had quite insulted the caliph
enough, Ibn Tumart tartly added, “The Caliphate belongs to God, not to you ‘Ali Ibn
Yusuf.”191
Acts such as these not only challenged the Almoravid authority but further
cemented Ibn Tumart’s legitimacy as a leader among his followers. The Almohad
philosophy actively rejected the Maliki school from al-Andalus adhered to by the
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Almoravid, and constructed a new practice based on parallels to the early years of
Mohammed to establish their legitimacy.192
4.3.2 Create a Mythology
“Islam began as something strange and will revert to being strange as it began, so give
glad tidings to strangers.” 193
The hadith above was quoted by Ibn Tumart to emphasize two parallels that
existed between the original founding of Islam under Mohammed and the Almohad
movement. The first parallel stemmed from the Almohad’s move from Aghmat to Tinmal
to avoid persecution by the Almoravid. The hadith refers to the period when Mohammed
and his scant number of followers escaped and made their first pilgrimage from Mecca to
Medina. Tinmal was the Almohad Mecca; their pilgrimage to this impregnable fortress in
the Atlas Mountains helped them avoid Almoravid attacks.194 The second reason for
quoting this hadith regarded the relationship to the word “strange” in Arabic ( ،غريب
)المغرب. In Arabic “strange” can mean “different” and “being far from home.” It is also
derived from the same root as the name for the Maghreb. The implication inferred from
this by Tumart confirmed that not only were the Almohad strange, in that there were only
a few in number, but that it also implied that Muhammed himself had foretold that the
Maghreb would produce a new mahdi. Ibn Tumart also quoted hadiths that mentioned
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that the Berbers were superior to the Arabs and that “God would open a gate” to restore
Islam in the Maghreb.195
Ibn Tumart was “proclaimed” mahdi during Ramadan of 1121, after he had given
a moving sermon at Sus al-Aqsa.196
Glory to God, who does what he wants and realizes what he desires; there is none
to resist his mandate nor oppose his judgment. The prayer of God over our
Prophet Muhammad, sent by God, he that announced that an Imama al-Mahdi, he
that will fill the land with equity and justice, as it is now full of injustice and
oppression, he will be sent by God to erase the falseness with the truth and to
substitute it with equity and justice; to the Maghreb the extremity of his land and
the end of the time of times and the name is the name and the genealogy the
genealogy and the deed the deed.197
After this sermon, ten followers jumped to their feet and proclaimed Ibn Tumart the
messenger from God who fit this description, that Ibn Tumart was the mahdi. These
followers would be called “The Companions,” and in a post-event, constructed
encomium, this story enhanced the image of the Almohad and Ibn Tumart.198 This was a
period when public sermons, khutba, in particular those preached on Friday, remained
powerful tools for communication, not only for religious messages, but political missives
as well. Jones argues that Ibn Tumart’s scant mention of the Prophet Muhammad in his
khutba was reminiscent of the Fatimids, who emphasized the role of ‘Ali at the expense
of Muhammad. Tumart, on the other hand, spent time in his oratory establishing himself
as the mahdi.199
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Four elements of the sermon repeat themselves to communicate a specific
message: end of the time of times, and the name is the name, and the genealogy the
genealogy, and the deed the deed. The time of times emphasizes that Tumart had been
sent at this specific moment to be mahdi; the name is the name underscores that Ibn
“Muhammad” Tumart shared the same name with Muhammad the Prophet; the
genealogy of genealogy supports Tumart’s claim of Sharifian (from Mohammad’s tribe)
descent; and the deed the deed was in reference to mahdism as a completion of
Muhammad’s mission.200
As part of the myth building by the Almohad and the many hagiographic calques
they drew with Muhammad, they went to great lengths to establish their Sharifian
credibility. Huici Miranda underscores that “their genealogies were falsified” and that the
Almohad spared no effort to make this connection.201 Sanchez further explains that the
twelfth-century Kitab al-Ansab’s (Book of Ancestry of the Almohad)202 author, assumed
to be Ibn ‘Abd al-Halim and attached to the Almohad court, wrote extensively to
demonstrate that the Berbers embraced Islam before the Arab invasion, not because of
it.203 “As the twelfth-century Kitab al-Ansab demonstrated, the use of names to identify a
simultaneous Berber and Arab ancestry enjoyed widespread diffusion among the
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Almohad tribes.”204 Both Ibn Tumart and Abd al-Mu’min strived to prove the link
between their lineage and descent from the prophet. Abd al-Mu'min’s lineage, established
through an agnatic connection, legitimized him to both Berber and Arab audiences.205
Fierro specifies that Abd al-Mu’min traced his family back to the prophet cognatically,
on the female side to the Irdris, and the male line through al-‘Abbas, the uncle of the
prophet.206 Fierro notes that Abd al-Mu’min’s male uncle descended from Fatima, the
prophet’s daughter, so, strictly speaking, not agnatically, as required by Islamic law.
These lineages endured as critical elements of Almohad propaganda and were assuredly
written after the death of Ibn Tumart to ensure Abd al-Mu’min’s claim to the caliphate.
Al-Mu’min had usurped the caliphal power from the brothers of Ibn Tumart and
remained sensitive to creating his own legacy.
Abd al-Mu’min also established his familial links to the Beni Hilal, the Arab
tribes that invaded the Maghreb in the eleventh century. After the Almohad had defeated
them, the Beni Hilal were coopted into the Almohad army by al-Mu’min, who would
enlist their support to invade and conquer al-Andalus and to maintain his balance of
power in the Maghreb.207 This myth making by the Almohad furnished one of the
propaganda tools to establish their legitimacy amongst their followers in the Maghreb and
beyond. They communicated these myths in the language that the people understood:
Berber (Tamazight).
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4.3.4 Develop a Common Language
The Almohad, to engender a sense of belonging to their movement, leveraged
their common language, Berber (Amazigh, people; Tamazight, language). Berber not
Arabic, had been used by the Almoravid’s Ibn Tashfin when he began to teach, or
reteach, Islam to the Sanhaja. This had religio-political implications as in some respects
this usage went against the founding of Islam, where at least initially, being Arab and
speaking Arabic went hand in hand with being Muslim.208 Ibn Tumart was eloquent in
both Arabic and Tamazight and would continue the Almoravid practice of using the
Berber language to attracted followers through his preaching ability.209 He created a
curriculum in the Berber language composed of one book in seven parts; one part to be
read each day and required reading for his followers.210 Two other books he authored
were added to this library; one was named “The Dogmas,” and the other “The
Imamate.”211 This curriculum reified the daily practice of Islam for the followers of
Tumart; it established a form of education and indoctrination, and through this praxis he
created a group feeling and cohesion. 212
Hobsbawm initially downplayed the usefulness of thinking of language as a tool
for nation building as “fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous… and useful for the purposes of
the traveler’s orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks.” 213 However, later
he recognizes that the use of languages “becomes [a] more conscious exercise in social
Sánchez, “Ethnic Disaffection and Dynastic Legitimacy in the early Almohad Period: Ibn Tumart’s
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209 Al-Hulal Al Mawsiyya, crónica árabe de las dinastías Almoravide, Almohade y Benimerin, 132.
210 Ibid., 131.
211 Ibid.
212 Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires, 68.
213 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 6.
208

76

engineering in proportion as their symbolic significance prevails over their actual use.” 214
Anderson also recognized the importance of language, in that even if its usage was
established haphazardly, it could communicate a position of power. 215 In the case of Ibn
Tumart, he used language to communicate his power to his Berber followers and to
endow a new sense of belonging and legitimacy that transcended the Arabic language.
One cannot overstate the idea that the Berbers, as regards Islam, were viewed
nearly as second-class citizens, forced to learn Arabic in order to practice their religion;
many Muslim jurists believed a that the Friday sermon was required to be performed in
Arabic, and Arabic alone.216 The Almohad changed this emphasis and mandated that
preachers speak the Berber language.217 We know that the first two Almohad caliphs
spoke Berber and the sources make a point of saying that the third, Abu Yusuf Ya’qub alMansur (r. 1184-1199), was raised in Seville and spoke Arabic well, implying that his
native tongue was still Berber. Even the sixth caliph, Abu Muhammad al-Wahid (r 1224),
was found to address a crowd in Seville first in Berber and then in Arabic. 218 The Berber
language was thus another unifying tool that the Almohad incorporated into their daily
practices to engender a sense of belonging to their followers.
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4.3.5 Symbolism of the State
Cultural-religious elements played an important role in the founding of the
empire. Ibn Tumart’s charisma and belief in his message attracted followers and provided
them a standard bearer around whom they could rally and coalesce. But beyond this
philosophy, what allowed the Almohad to endure and increase their empire was the
ability to translate their message into actionable aspects of rule such as minting coins,
building monuments, and constructing an infrastructure that communicated the lasting
strength and inevitableness of their reign.
A dramatic quotidian development was the conversion to square metal currency
from the round Marabitun Almoravid coinage. Specifically, the Almohad
changed the silver dirham to a square and maintained the round shape for the gold
dirhams, while inserting a square design feature in the middle. 219

219
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Figure 4. Almoravid Coins

Ali ibn Yussuf, 1107-1142,
dinar, 3.97 g., 26mm. Seville mint

Ali ibn Yusuf, 1107-1142,
Spanish quirate 8 g., 11mm, unnamed mint

Figure 3. Almohad Coins

Abu Muhammad ‘Abd Allah, 1224-1227,
dinar, 4.6 g., 29mm, unnamed mint

Abd al-Mu’min, 1146-1180,
half dirham, 0.8 g., 11mm, Fez Mint

Initially, they minted gold coins nearly half the weight of the Almoravid’s dirhams (2.3 g.
vs. 4.6 g.); it has been conjectured that this evolved because they had yet to gain control
of the major gold routes of the South between Ghana, Sijilmasa, and Marrakech, where
the Almoravid had the strongest presence. The caliph Abu Ya’qub Yusuf (1163-1184),
however, remedied this distinction when he doubled the weight to 4.66 grams in 1185,
when he realized that the currency was being devalued.220 The Almohad also deleted all
the caliphal dates from the coins,221 possibly to signify that their rule would be eternal
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with no fixed date to its beginning or end. Their coins always incorporated a religious
saying, and in the interest of building legitimacy, they included a genealogy tracing their
decent back to Abd al-Mu’min and the mahdi, Ibn Tumart.222 Another Almohad
departure was the more common use of naskh (cursive) script. The development of Naskh
only occurred in the tenth century, so its usage may have signified a departure from the
earlier established practice of the Maliki-influenced Almoravid, who mostly employed
the kufi (angular) script.223
It has already been documented that the Almohad demonstrated a change in
religious philosophy, and this was dramatically symbolized by the cleansing of the
Almoravid mosques before entering to pray in them. 224 This symbolically reinforced the
impurity of the Almoravid practices, and additionally, some evidence suggests that the
Almohad reoriented the minbars to ensure that they more accurately faced Mecca. They
produced the most astrolabes of any kingdom in medieval Maghreb or Iberia, and these
instruments were used in navigation and for aligning minbars as well.225
Perhaps the most dramatic change, in terms of communicating legitimacy, was
represented in Almohad architecture. Ibn Tumart became famous for building mosques
and schools in the villages, and the mosque in Tinmal provided a dramatic example of
this, with its majestic setting and the striking simplicity of design. 226 Their first mosque,
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constructed in Tinmal, although small in scale, could not be surpassed in elegance with
its hypnotic, linear structure. Built in 1148 and settled in the High Atlas Mountains, it
emerged as the Almohad’s impregnable redoubt. Ignacio Gonzalez Cavero specifies its
similarities to the great Umayyad mosque in Cordoba and believes that it is similar to the
works of the Andalusian engineer, Malaga al-Hayyay I’yis, who also worked on the
maqsura of the Kutubiyya mosque in Marrakesh (constructed 1184-1199).227
Figure 4. Tinmal Mosque: Horseshoe Arches and Interior Architecture 228

The second caliph, Abu Ya’qub Yusuf, had been raised in Seville, and upon his
triumphant return as caliph, made the city of his youth the Almohad capital in Spain and
constructed its impressive mosque (1172-1176) in recognition of its preeminence.229 This
work contained seventeen naves, horseshoe arches, and a passageway connected to the
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palace, reminiscent of the Great Mosque of Cordoba. The Giralda, or minaret, was
constructed of aloe and red and yellow sandalwood with gold and silver covering,230 and
was identical to the Kutubiyya in Marrakech.
Figure 5. The Minaret Tower of the Kutubiyya Mosque in Marrakech
(left) and Seville Giralda Tower (right) 231

The Almohad established more subtle changes as well. All buildings were
commemorated with quotations from the Quran and not the name of the ruler; this
represented a departure from the Almoravid and the Umayyad before them, and
reinforced the strong religiosity of their message. 232 Martinez argues that this epigraphic
change demonstrates a separation from Maghrebi and Andalusian practices and displays
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the meticulous attention to the details of the entire communicative process.233 He viewed
this artistic-political expression as a manifestation of the changes that occurred across the
Islamic world in the twelfth century, and believes that the Almohad wanted to
communicate a separation from the past and convey the mysticism embodied of the
teachings of al-Ghazali.234 They also introduced cursive writing and ataurique design in
the decorations of their mosques. 235 The Almohad Masmuda came from the mountains
where there was more vegetation than the desert plains occupied by the Almoravid
Sanhaja, and perhaps this explains their comfort with these verdant designs.
Figure 6. Vegetation Design from the Tinmal Mosque 236

The symbolism of the Almohad communicated the changes in philosophy and ruling
structure, but most importantly their strength and the inevitability of their rule.
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4.4 Administrative Bureaucracy
4.4.1 Communication Network
4.4.1.1 Physical Presence
The itinerant nature of the caliphate provided one of the methods that
communicated to the governing elites and local populace that they were connected with
the kingdom, and that the rule had vitality. This displayed an organized, ritualistic
process that was purposeful and studied.237 One could argue that the Almohad had four
different capitals––Tinmal, Marrakesh, Ribat, and Seville––and to reinforce their
presence the Almohad constructed buildings and put administrations in place, even when
the caliphate was not in court. The effective kings of this dynasty displayed a peripatetic
leadership and participated in virtually all decisive battles. The confrontations listed
below are examples of state-sponsored campaigns that were the major turning points in
the history of the Almohad.238
Table 1. Almohad Leaders and Battle Attendance
Almohad Leader

Battle

Ibn Tumart

Al Buhayra (1130)

Abd al-Mu’min

The Fall of Marrakech (1147)
The Battle of Seti (1153)
Battle of Alarcos (1195)

Abu Ya’qub Yusuf

Santarém (1184) (where he died)

Abu Yusuf Ya’qub al-Nasir

Las Navas de Tolosa (1212)
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The work of Buresi and El Aallaoui tracks the government on the move through
the analysis of administrative documents sent from the region of the kingdom in which
the Almohad caliphs found themselves, with their “curial, administrative, financial,
fiscal, and military services” in attendance.239 The caliphs made these journeys to
evaluate the status of their realms, hear the complaints from their subjects, and to conquer
new territory, but also to communicate their regal power through the use of symbolism.
Ibn Sahib’s documentation of Abd al-Mu’min’s first campaign to al-Andalus serves as a
resplendent example.
Abd al-Mu’min began his campaign to al-Andalus from Rabat preceded by the
Quran of Ibn Tumart and the Quran of the Prophet ‘Uthman, which the Almohad had
obtained from the Umayyads. The Quran of ‘Uthman was protected by a red box
enshrined with in pearls, rubies and emeralds. 240 The Qurans served to legitimize the
Almohad, and in particular Abd al-Mu’min, in two ways. First, it associated his rule to
that of the founding mahdi, Ibn Tumart; and second, it connected the Almohad empire to
the glorious dynasty of the Umayyads of Spain. Mounted on his brilliant steed the caliph
was proceeded by flags of vivid yellow, red, and white, and four small candles and
spears, each of which had a golden apple settled on its point. Behind him would follow
his direct family members with sixteen large banners and large oval shields of pure silver
that reached to the ground.241 After the family would come the Almohad and Arab tribes,
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filling the entire landscape with pomp and power. 242 Upon arriving at a location from
these journeys, prayers were offered in a single gathering, and this too served to reaffirm
the legitimacy of the Almohad as leaders of the faithful.
4.4.1.2 Communication of the Khutbah
During the caliphate of Abd al-Mu’min he distributed detailed circular letters
intended to be read from the khutbah on Friday. Every victory was disseminated to each
region in order to, as Buresi and El Aallaoui conjecture, “promote pre-national
sentiment…and cohesion through the empire.”243 These circular missives and sermons
from the khutbah advertised victories and reinforced the sense of power, omnipresence,
and inevitableness of their reign. A telling example of this occurred early in the dynasty,
when Abd al-Mu’min and the Almohad conquered al-Mahdiya in 1160. The court scribe,
Ibn Sahib, conveys how “they read the announcement from the pulpits… and spread the
happy news to all his subjects and tribes, and the riders flew with the news to all the
regions of the lands and damaged the ears of all the infidels, thanks be to God.” 244 After
another victory by the Almohad over Ibn Mardanis, Sahib relates that it took less than
sixteen days from Murcia to Marrakech (the fastest possible according to his account) to
communicate this news.245
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The use of the Friday pulpit did not represent a new practice to the Maghreb or alAndalus, but the Almohad proved especially disciplined in exercising this tool to
communicate to the faithful. The event of the completion of the great mosque in Seville
provides an example. Abu Ya’qub Yusuf (r. 1163-1184) mandated that his son, Abu
Ishaq, require that all male citizens attend Friday services at the new mosque to hear the
sermon on April 24, 1182. This communication reinforced the presence of the Almohad
and demonstrated their regal power in one of the most impressive architectural
constructions in their realm.246
4.4.2 Jurists and the Law
The administrative backbone of the Almohad was not created ex nihilo; they
relied heavily on the secretarial apparatus established by the Almoravid before them.247
Bureaucrats from al-Andalus were employed to aid building the state:
The Almoravid [and Almohad] administration relied heavily on the recruitment of
Andalusi officials, who were instrumental to the incorporation of the western
Maghreb into a more homogeneous tax system predicated on Maliki norms rather
than on the decisions of individual chiefs. Financial affairs seem to have been in
the hands of an official called a mushrif (overseer) who was often of civilian
Andalusi background.248
Although their bureaucratic structure never rose to the level of the Umayyads in alAndalus, the Almoravid and Almohad added more legal infrastructure and the number of
Maghreb jurists grew from six to fifteen in the eleventh to twelfth century (Table 2, F.
Maghreb column).
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Table 1. Jurists Recorded in Qadi 'Iyadi's Biographical Dictionary (cont.) 249
Cen.

Medina

V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII

1
2
1
1

Total

64

Mecca

1
2
2

Yemen

3

Iraq
2
5
22
13
23
25
8
5

Syria

1
2
3

3
7

3

114

14

Egypt

Ifriqiya Andalus F. Maghrib

41
21
26
15
13
9
2
3
3

27
79
51
59
21
11
29
24
20

71
118
174
108
82
56
64
21
43

194

356

779

3
2
5
6
6
15
37

One example of the improved governing structure of the Almohad can be seen in their
legal fatwas, which provide insight into the importance of gold, the development of the
economy, and the increased trade with al-Andalus.250 It is clear from Gomez-Rivas’s
study of fatwas that gold, commerce, and irrigation were monitored and regulated by the
Almohad governing system (Table 3). The number of fatwas concerning management of
the economy exploded during the period of the Almohad dynasty. During their reign,
fatwas concerning the economy and endowments increased from 3 to 180 and from 182
to 260, in the Far Maghreb and al-Andalus respectively (Table 3).
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Table 3. Fatwas of Identifiable Origin in al-Wansharisi's Mi'yar

Procedural,
Procedural,
Economy,
Economy,
Ritual, Family Ritual, Family Endowments Endowments
IX-XII
XII-XV
IX-XII
XII-XV
Far Maghrib
Central Maghrib
Ifriqiya
al-Andalus

1
9
256
160

106
43
180
179

3
12
178
182

180
68
136
260

An example of one fatwa regarding water rights and irrigation follows:
The orchard owners are more entitled to irrigate their orchards than the owner of
the mill, even if they planted (ansha’u) their gardens after the miller built his mill.
When they are no longer in need to irrigate, the miller can channel the water to his
mill. This is what I think and say concerning this question, based on its sense as it
appears in the hadith of the Prophet (the peace and blessings of God be upon him)
concerning the flow of Mahzur and Mudhaynab, because he judged (qadiya) that
upstream users take water up to the ankles and then send it downstream.251
These rulings provide some indication of the expanding administrative system that the
Almohad put in place in the Maghreb and al-Andalus.252
4.4.3 Attract Followers and Organize the Administration
4.4.3.1 Tribalism Revisited
The word “tribalism” is often used to characterize the dynasties of the Maghreb
and one must be cognizant of the potential pejorative overtones of this word. Bennison
describes tribes as having three basic elements: “first, the belief that all the members of
the group are joined by kinship, whether real or fictive; secondly, a keen interest in
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genealogical ancestry to determine social and political relationships; and, thirdly, reliance
on a form of political organization often described by anthropologists as ‘segmentarity,’ a
theoretically egalitarian type of organization in which several family ‘segments’ form one
clan, several clan ‘segments’ form one tribe, several tribe ‘segments’ form a larger tribal
people or confederation.”253 This segmentary definition relies on the ideas promulgated
by E. E. Evans Pritchard, commented on extensively by Ernest Gellner and David
Hart.254 Gellner, in his Saints of the Atlas, proposed that because the state in the Maghreb
did not exist, tribes relied on themselves, and would only aggregate in times of trouble,
and that this cohesion was not permanent. He argued that kinship is to tribe as
bureaucracy is to the modern state,255 and that only external threats created cohesion, not
internal agencies.256 This definition of tribe could easily fit the descriptions of kingdoms
both north and south of the Tagus river; what were the interrelated families of the
northern Christian kingdoms of Iberia, if not tribes? The northern kingdoms could also be
seen as ‘joined by kinship’ that operated as their ‘state bureaucracy’ and would only
‘aggregate in times of trouble,’ as described by Bennison and Gellner above. However,
Gellner finds that whereas Christianity was “organized, hierarchical, and ritually rich,”
Islam was “minoritarian, fragmented, and discontinuous.”257 The argument of
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Five Fifths in Tribal Morocco,” Revue de l’Occident Musulman y de la Méditerrananeé 3 (1967): 65-95.
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Christianity’s distinction is plausibly reinforced by the support and coordination provided
by the Christian church to the northern kingdoms of Iberia.
One of the elements that allowed the Almohad to create their empire was the
ability to expand their base of support beyond their native tribes and clans. The three
major clan groups of the period were the Sanhaja, the Masmuda, and the Zenata. These
groups provided the major representatives of the Almoravid, the Almohad, and the
Marinid dynasties respectively. While each of these groups had its own dialect, they all
spoke a form of the Berber language that was intelligible amongst themselves. However,
this separation of groups does call into question how long an aggregation of tribes, in
particular those outside of a specific tribal membership, would coalesce. The example of
the tribes organized by Ibn Tumart support Gellner’s thesis of unity caused by outside
threats, and the Masmuda and Zenata would come to challenge this unity later in the
history of the empire. As will be discussed in more detail, the Zenata were initially
Table 2. The Tribes and Dynasties of Medieval Morocco
Tribe

Dynasty

Geography

Language

Sanhaja

Almoravid
(1040-1147)

Middle Atlas
(South)

Tamazight

Masmuda

Almohad
(1120-1269)

Anti-Atlas
(Central)

Tashilhit

Zenata

Marinid
(1244-1465)

Rif
(North)

Tharifits

faithful to the Almohad cause and participated in the seven-year campaign in the
Maghreb and at the Battle of Alarcos in Iberia. However, having chosen a Zenata, Abd
al-Mu’min, from outside of the major Masmuda tribal group, the Almohad seeded one of
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the future divisions to their rule. Abd al-Mu-min attracted the Arabs and his Zenata
tribesmen to the Almohad cause, but when later generations were unable to secure the
same level of success as he and his two successors, the Zenata Marinids would develop
into one of the main sources of the Almohad demise.
The charismatic Ibn Tumart successfully created an external threat to Islam by
highlighting the anthropomorphism of the Almoravid. However, his appeal to the
Masmuda tribes was also economic, for as the Almoravid moved north outside of their
historical southern territory into Marrakech and beyond, they disrupted the trade routes of
the Masmuda. García’s theory is that the Almohad assembly became necessary because
of the Almoravid blockades to their historical trade with the southern plains. 258 This
further supports the argument that while ideology became an element of their success, the
Almohad proved just as motivated by material gains (or losses) when they rebelled
against the Almoravid.
4.4.3.2 Organization and Administration
The Almohad leadership constructed a political infrastructure that attempted to
supersede tribal loyalties.259 The clearest delineation of each group was outlined in Kitab
al Ansab (Book of Genealogy), which detailed their group structure and the Sharifian
genealogies of Ibn Tumart and Abd al-Mu’min. As previously mentioned, the initial
group of ten supporters that proclaimed Ibn Tumart to be the mahdi were labeled “The

Sénén García,“The Masmuda Berbers and Ibn Tumart: An Ethnographic Interpretation of the Rise of the
Almohad Movement,” Journal of African Studies 18 (1990): 11, 17.
259 Two excellent pieces of analysis regarding this topic are Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire,
and Hopkins, “The Almohad Hierarchy,” 93-112.
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Companions” or “The Ten.”260 These men might be thought of as Tumart’s cabinet. In
the Kitab al Ansab special duties such as judge, imam (prayer leader), and the secretary
were assigned for this group.261
The second set of followers, “The Fifty” (Ahl Khamsin), acted as a chamber of
deputies. Echoing the influence of the Berber language mentioned above, this may have
been an autochthonous development, as the council of fifty paralleled Berber traditions
(agrao or taqbilt) that entailed elections of tribal leaders to participate in councils and
adjudicate tribal disputes. 262 This original council of fifty consisted of nineteen
representatives from Tinmal that were not necessarily related by clan, and as such may
have originated from diverse regions.263 The tribes represented in The Fifty in order of
strength were: Hargha, Ganfisa, Haskura, Gadmiwa, Sanhaja, Hintata, and Qaba’il.264

Al-Hulal Al Mawsiyya, crónica arabe de las dinastias Almoravide, Almohade y Benimerin, 128. In this
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262 Fromherz, The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire, 124-125.
263 Hopkins, “The Almohad Hierarchy,” 96.
264 Ibid. Al Hulal mentions similar tribes: Harga, Tinmal, Hintata, Gadmiwa, Haskura y Sinhaya, Al Hulal,
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Table 3. Tribal Representation within the Council of The Fifty
Tribe

265

Before the
Purge
19

After the
Purge
21

Ibn Sahib alSala
14

Hargha

8

8

6

Gansfa

4

5

4

Gadmiwa

4

4

2

Haskura

4

4

3

Hintata

2

8

3

Sanhaja

3

3

3

Qaba’il

1

1

1

Total

45

54

36

Ahl Tinmal

Curiously, the Sanhaja and the Haskura of the Almoravid were represented, and
this may indicate early defectors from the Almoravid cause, but also reinforced the
universal nature of the Almohad movement that encouraged tribes outside of the
Masmuda to join. One tribe conspicuously missing from the list in the Ansab and the
Hulal was the that of Abd al-Mu’min, the Kumiya. The Kumiya were members of the
Zenata tribe, who would later join Abd al-Mu’min on his military campaign to defeat the
Almoravid and participate in the battle of Alarcos in Iberia. This council summary

Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 63. Buresi and Aallaoui specify the tribal groups in the
table summarized above was derived from two different sources: al-Baydaq and Ibn Sahib al-Sala.
Table taken from ‘I. al-D. Musa, “Al-tanzimat al-hizbiyya,” 63. “After the Purge” represents the period
when some resistant members of local tribes, in particular the elders, where killed.
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demonstrates that at least initially, widespread representation existed across numerous
tribes within the Masmuda-Almohad structure.
The next level of governance developed by Ibn Tumart constituted “The Seventy”
and the talibis (literally “students”), who were religious scholars. The latter group would
come to be divided into two. The first would be sent to the different districts of the realm
to advise leaders on religious and military issues; and the second would stay with the
mahdi or the caliph wherever he traveled.266 They were considered the religious and
constitutional delegates of the organization and were often assigned to tribal areas not
indigenous to themselves; thus, they represented the central government and not their
specific tribal interests. 267 Also delineated among the remaining followers were the
regular army (jund), the foot soldiers (quza), and the archers (ruma).268 Each of the
groups enumerated were separated and had their respective responsibilities. Al Hulal
describes that “each class of these had their own organization, and they did not mix with
the other, neither while traveling or in residence, and each stayed with themselves in their
own place, and did not leave from there.”269
This separation of classes represents the conflicting dynamic within the Almohad
structure. On the one hand, the Almohad leadership attempted to integrate the tribes, as
opposed to merely maintaining them in their separate enclaves. Countering this
integration, was the separation of duties by groups defined above in Al Hulal, and the fact
that Ibn Tumart placed his own people, the Hargha, in the first rank among tribes. This

Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 107-108.
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269 Ibid., 131.
266
267

95

separation would be exacerbated by the appointment of Abd al-Mu’min as the first
caliph. He was a Kumiya and this tribe was not part of the Masmuda or the original tribal
group represented in Tinmal.270 One suspects that after the establishment of the family
dynasty by Abd al-Mu’min, and the appointment of many of his family members to
governorships and other positions, this integrated tribal dynamic would have been altered
or minimized.271
The harsh reality of the Almohad revolution revealed that once established in
Tinmal pockets of resistance to their movement existed. In particular, the record shows
that some of the older generations of sheikhs and ulema had demonstrated defiance to Ibn
Tumart, and as a result they were slaughtered.272 Al-Baydaq, the earliest court document
of the Almohad movement, recorded a period of forty days when members from the five
primary tribes were culled from the true believers (this is referred to as “The Purge” in
Table 5).273 Berber society was accustomed to a more egalitarian organizational structure
and Ibn Tumart had force-fit a more hierarchical system and coopted those willing to
conform to his vision.274 One of the men who survived this purge and emerged as the
leader of Tumart’s campaign was Abd al-Mu’min.

Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 91.
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Córdoba a instancias de Abu-l-Walid b Rusd; a Abu Zayd al-Hardani el de Granada y a Abu ‘Abd Allah el
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Murcia.
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On his return from the East Ibn Tumart had recruited Abd al-Mu’min when they
had met in Ifriqiya in 1117. Ibn Tumart asked Abd al-Mu’min what he was looking for
and Abd al-Mu’min responded that he was travelling to the East to learn more of the
science of Islam. Ibn Tumart responded, “I have something better than this...the glory of
this world and the next. Accompany me and help me with my endeavor to kill the
prohibited, vivificate the science [of Islam], and extinguish the heresies.”275 Abd alMu’min accepted Tumart’s proposal and represented part of The Ten at the point of their
move to Tinmal. However, al-Mu’min solidified his position after his strong showing at
the disastrous battle at Buhayra (1130); his rise in the organization further improved after
the death of his strongest rival, al Bashir, during this same conflict.
Although it took three years from the announcement of Tumart’s death for alMu’min’s to emerge as the leader of the Almohad, he wasted no time in recruiting many
of his own clan, the Kumiya, to positions of power.276 Abd al-Mu’min further segmented
his followers into factions: those that had embraced the cause before the battle of
Buhayra; the companions (al-sabqun al-awwalun), who were present during the sevenyear war and before the fall of Oran (1145); and those who adhered to the movement
after the fall of Marrakech.277 The importance of this prioritization can be distinguished
in two ways: first, these groups were marked by two battles, supporting the view that Abd

Abd al-Wahid Al-Marrakusi. Colección de crónicas árabes de la Reconquista volumen iv, 139. “Llamó
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Oriente en busca de la ciencia. Le dijo Ibn Tumart: eco algo mejor que eso». Le contestó: «y ¿qué es ello?’.
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al-Mu’min was a military-minded leader; and second, the record makes clear that the
seven-year campaign, supported by the Zenata tribe, strengthened Abd al-Mu’min’s
support outside the dominant Masmuda.
The Almohad attracted the Masmuda, some dissenting Sanhaja, and the coastal
Kumiya, and at least initially, it appears that Ibn Tumart attempted to develop a more
integrated form of asibiya than had ever been previously accomplished in the Maghreb.
Furthermore, Abd al-Mu’min would go on to integrate the Arab tribes of Ifriqiya, which
will be addressed separately below in section 4.6.2. This mixture of tribes was not held
together by asibiya alone; what sustained this unity over the course of the first four
caliphs was an expanding economy and the opportunity to acquire wealth.
4.5 Economic Control
The Almohad economy built upon what the Almoravid had constructed to manage
their empire. The economic triad of gold-salt-finished goods provided the impetus for the
expansion of these proto-states’ trade networks and political apparatuses, and in part
drew them into Andalusia. The dominance of gold and the control of the caravan routes
of Awdaghust-Sijilmasa-Marrakech-Ceuta, established by the Almoravid and continued
by the Almohad, increased trade substantially. However, evidence also suggests that the
establishment of urban trading centers, Marrakech being the premier example, led to the
abandonment or destruction of smaller agricultural towns by the Almoravid and the
Almohad both.278 The archeological research conducted by Boone and Benco confirms
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that the Almoravid-Almohad central seats of power were established to “facilitate longdistance trade between West African and Mediterranean economic spheres,”279 and
Boone and Benco document a precipitous decrease in mid-size towns during the
Almoravid-Almohad period.280 The growth of towns along the Mediterranean littoral
facilitated an increase in trade with al-Andalus and the rest of the Mediterranean, and
may have come at the expense of internal agricultural production. An example of the
importance of agricultural to the Almohad state was the tax revenue generated by olives
from Marrakech (30,000 dinars a year), Meknes (35,000), and Fez (50,000) which
supported of the central government.281 This revenue would come under attack in the
early stages of the Marinid revolt, in particular Meknes and Fez, which were closer to the
Zenata’s strongholds.
In essence, the Almohad protected their supply chain and not their territorialbased production. This would have implications when the conflicts with the northern
Christian states in Iberia, and later with the Marinids in the Maghreb, increased. Boone
and Benco’s work implies that as the Almohad became more commercially driven––and
centralized––they also became more vulnerable to attacks from the periphery that could
threaten their food supply.282 Fez and Marrakesh, important nodes in these trade routes,
were formidable, walled cities, but if a rebel group took these cities or disrupted the trade

Ibid., 51-71. See also Camilo Gómez-Rivas, “Las Navas de Tolosa, the Urban Transformation of the
Maghrib, and the Territorial Decline of al-Andalus,” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 4, no. 1 (2012):
27-32.
280 Ibid., 54. Two agrarian cities cited, Al-Basra and Nakur, were abandoned during this period.
281 Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 169.
282 James L. Boone, Emlen Myers, and Charles L. Redman, “Archeological and Historical Approaches to
Complex Societies: the Islamic States of Medieval Morocco,” American Anthropologist, n. s. 92, no. 3
(1990): 644. See also Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 200.
279

99

flow between them, they would be able to control much of the military and commercial
state.
Constable, on the other hand, argues that once they had dominated al-Andalus, the
Almohad, like the Almoravid before them, exploited its resources, and there is little
evidence of economic decline under their regime.283 Seville, the Almohad capital in alAndalus, was famous across the Mediterranean for its olive oil, and one could travel for
“twelve miles across and forty miles long, from Seville to Niebla, [and] it was planted
with fig trees and olives.”284 As previously mentioned (Chapter 3.3, p. 39), a thriving
trade in silk existed, with 3,000 silk farms in Jaen alone.285 Jews were active in the textile
trade and silk in particular, and the Geniza documents provide ample proof not only of
their activity in this commerce, but of the triangle of trade between the Mashriq, Iberia,
and Morocco.286 Similar to Constable, Glick confirms the idea that Marrakech and Fez
became integral hubs of the Mediterranean trade network and thrived under the
Almoravid and Almohad.287 Glick emphasizes that the Jewish and Christian “middleclass sub-group, the fuqaha, provided the personnel which staffed the judicial and
executive offices of urban jurisdictions (e.g., judgeships and prefectures), which provided
the low-level institutional continuity and gave cohesion to the society even in the face of
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political instability at its upper levels.”288 It does appear, however, that the arrival of the
Almohad applied pressure on the Jewish traders to convert to Islam, although some
conversions may have been less than sincere, and crypto-Jews more than likely continued
to trade.
Commensurate with the arrival of the Almohad was the rise of the Italian city
states. The Genoese and Pisans established themselves as dominant participants in
Mediterranean commerce and their influence was felt in both the Maghreb and Spain.
The Almohad took advantage of their presence and were not above doing business with
the infidel from the Italian city states. Directly after taking power in Tunis in 1160, Abd
al-Mu’min signed a fifteen-year treaty with the Genoese, allowing them to pay 20 percent
less tax than other foreign traders in the southern ports along the Mediterranean littoral.289
David Abulafia in his monograph, The Two Italies, uncovered data that demonstrates that
Almohad-controlled ports represented as much as 29 percent of the total Genoese trade
from 1191. However, in the critical period after Las Navas, in 1214, this fell to only 20
percent driven by Ceuta, where trade fell from 13 to 4.2 percent, implying a major
dislocation during this period.290
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Table 4. Genoese Mediterranean 1191-1227 291
Destinations
Ceuta
Bougie
Tunis
Spain
Sub Total

1191
10.6%
4.7%
3.3%
2.1%
20.7%

12003
14.0%
12.0%
0.4%
3.0%
29.4%

1205-16
13.0%
13.7%
0.5%
0.4%
27.6%

1214
4.2%
16.1%
0.1%
0.0%
20.4%

1222-27
14.4%
7.2%
5.5%
0.4%
27.5

20.0%

15.5%

32.2%

29.5%

38.8%

17.8%
0.0%
6.7%
17.0%
8.1%
0.1%
1.4%
0.4%
7.8%

15.5%
10.0%
9.0%
0.7%
20.0%
7.0%
12.0%
2.5%
0.5%

14.7%
7.3%
4.5%
0.0%
1.5%
2.7%
2.5%
4.0%
1.2%

40.9%
0.7%
2.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
2.7%
3.4%

12.0%
0.3%
6.0%
0.0%
4.8%
2.5%
4.7%
1.5%
0.7%

Almohad Ports

Oltramare
(Latin Kingdoms in
Levant)

Sicily
Alexandria
Sardinia
Romania
Naples
Corsica
France
Maremma
Other

This trade agreement was most likely renewed in 1176 and a new contract was signed by
1191. These treaties established trade not only for the southern shores of the
Mediterranean but al-Andalus as well, as Almeria, now under Almohad control, was
listed as one of the ports where the Genoese paid tariffs in 1143.292 The Genoese
maintained this relationship with the Almohad while at the same time they signed
commercial treaties with their enemies: Ibn Mardanis and the Ibn Ghaniya in the Balearic
islands.293 The Genoese records from this period indicate that commerce increased and
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Constable infers from the Genoese accounts that the entire economy grew under the
Almohad.294
As relates to internal trade, the Almohad paid meticulous attention to their tax
revenue and Abd al-Mu’min conducted a census of his empire to understand precisely
where he could garner more wealth. 295 Early in his reign Abd al Mu’min observed that:
It is very strange that with all our power we still lack money, while the
Almoravid, on the other hand, who only controlled to Tlemcen, pay their soldiers
well, and we control all of Ifriqiya, and we don’t have enough money to give our
Almohad soldiers. This is the strangest thing in the world. 296
Two potential reasons exist for this speech. First, this was early in the reign of the
Almohad, and because their conquest in the Maghreb proceeded from north to south, they
may not have controlled the strongholds of the Almoravid empire, located in the south,
that constituted the main source of gold. This is further supported by their coinage that
earlier in their reign consisted of half the weight of the Almoravid at 2.36 grams.297
Numismatic evidence supports that that the Almohad produced only half as much gold as
the Almoravid and even less later in their dynastic cycle. 298
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The second possible reason for Abd al-Mu’min’s pronouncement was to intimate
his suspicions of his tax collectors. Almohad caliphs would conduct audits of their tax
authorities, often with unforgiving results if found wanting in their duties. The second
caliph, Abu Ya’qub Yusuf, while travelling through Fez on his way to al-Andalus,
completed an audit of the entire area, which included Fez, Meknes, and Mulaya. From his
audit of the almojarife (tax collectors), he determined that they had defrauded the state
and through torture he impelled them to return 460,000 dinars.299 Abd al-Wahid also
speaks of tax collection and how during the reign of the second caliph no one from the
entire territory impeded the delivery of money owed to Marrakech.300
The Almohad clearly monitored and controlled their economy and the
documentation of gold production from the work of Messier provides convincing
evidence that they maintained strong gold production, albeit less than the Almoravid,
until the period of al-Nasir. They clearly understood that armies marched for money as
much as they did for belief, and payment from taxes and booty gained from conquest
represented two material levers available to help control their kingdom.
4.6 Military
4.6.1 Jihad
No standing armies existed in the Maghreb or the Iberian kingdoms; warriors
were attracted by booty and remuneration. The salience of the communication network
described above underscores the need to project and ensure clear transmission of any and
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all victories of the empire. This provided a reinforcing propaganda cycle that helped
recruit troops to missions when the time arose. Replacing the blood-feuds of the Maghreb
with a periphery target, such as the promise of the booty-rich Iberian peninsula, supplied
a strategy utilized by the Almoravid and Almohad alike to refocus the tribal mosaic of the
Maghreb.
This confirms one of the challenges for Ibn Tumart. Initially, his target was not
the Christians of Iberia but the Almoravid. His needed to create a scenario whereby
Muslims would enact jihad upon other Muslims, which was forbidden in Islam. This
underscores why his condemnation of the anthropomorphism of the Almoravid became
critical. Ibn Tumart labelled the Almoravid worse than Christians’ and more deserving of
jihad. He exhorted his followers to “apply yourselves in jihad against the veiled infidels
for this is more important than combating Christians and all the infidels twice or even
more.”301 Feuds existed between tribes before the arrival of the Almohad, but to develop
a sustained movement Ibn Tumart not only condemned the enemy as heretics, but
recruited a military leader with the ability to win battles and gain the confidence of his
followers. This demonstrates why Abd al-Mu’min’s seven-year war proved so critical.
By skirting the Anti-Atlas mountains he isolated and conquered smaller, less defended
towns, further away from Almoravid influence, and in doing so established a reputation
as a military leader who could achieve victory and deliver the requisite spoils this
entailed.
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Where did these soldiers come from? After initial recruits from tribal members,
soldiers adhered to the Almohad cause from throughout the empire. The second caliph,
Abu Ya’qub Yusuf, in preparation for his first campaign to al-Andalus, called for
volunteers to join the jihad in 1189. Yaqub Yusuf would review each tribe’s troops one
by one and prepare them for the coming campaign. 302 In this instance, soldiers from the
farthest reaches of the kingdom answered the call:
Many people hastily arrived, from the Abyssinians to the veiled ones of the
dessert [Almoravid]. They assembled in the capital; blacks and blonds of diverse
languages; and amongst the volunteers were Arabs and regular soldiers; enlisted
and not enlisted; and the result was that this multitude stretched through the
lengths of the fields more numerous than drops of water or so many rocks.303
Many of these men enlisted for one or two campaigns and then would return home to
their tribe in the Maghreb after the offensive. After the victory over Ibn Mardanis in
Murcia, for example, the troops asked for, and received, their pay and permission to
return home, as they had been gone for a long period of time. 304
Inherent in this call to arms was the requirement for a leader who could deliver
compensation on a consistent basis. The notion of jihad figured in this equation; however,
it is clear that jihad alone, with no hope of remuneration, had little influence on raising an
army. The Almohad had replaced the Almoravid in the Maghreb, and as a result the
resources of the realm were at their disposal and surely the stories of wealth and
opportunity had reached the furthest outposts of the kingdom. These soldiers, once
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enlisted, expected to be paid either in their share of the booty, gold, or both. Once victory
was attained, recognition, pay, and celebration not only reinforced asibiya but also the
reputation of the caliphate. It is instructive to review the reunion that Abd al Mu’min
conducted amongst his troops after his victory in Ifriqiya. An account of how each soldier
was paid was related by Ibn Sahib: Abd al Mu’min, seated by himself in an elevated
chair, ordered his vizier Abu-l-Ala Idris to dispense shirts of linen to all present and
divided 3,000 horses among the group.305 Clearly, the booty accrued from victory
reinforced loyalty and participation in the next campaign.
4.6.2 Enlist the Arab Tribes
Abd al Mu’min, a member of the Kumiya tribe, was born in the coastal town of
Tagra, and because of proximity became more familiar with the Hilali Arab tribes than
the Masmuda from the Central Atlas mountains. Many historians believe that the Banu
Hilal and Banu Salaym had migrated to the Maghreb in the eleventh century having been
sent by the Fatimids to subdue Ifriqiya. 306 Victoria Aguilar Sebastián argues that this was
not an invasion but a slow penetration that progressed over many years.307 Brett has also
shown that the Arab tribes had arrived before the conflicts between the Fatimids and the
Zirids, demonstrating that the domination of Ifriqiya could not have been the main
objective for their arrival.308
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Regardless of the reasons for their appearance in Ifriqiya, by the time of the
Almohad, the Arab tribes constituted a military presence that had to be addressed. At the
battle at Seti (1153) Abd al-Mu’min subdued the Arab tribes, but rather than leave them
as a disruptive force in the region, he invited them to join the Almohad to conduct jihad
on the Christians in al-Andalus.309 This accomplished three goals for al-Mu’min: first, he
displaced a large group of Arab fighters from Ifriqiya, where assuredly they would have
remained a threat to revolt; second, he added the formidable fighting strength of this
notoriously skillful cavalry to his army; and finally, through this political maneuver Abd
al-Mu’min established a counter-balance against the Almohad sheikhs and the larger
membership of the Masmuda tribe.310 He further engineered a demand from the Arabs,
whereby they requested that he provide one of his sons to govern their region, to which
he eloquently agreed:
God from the mouth of his prophet Moses said, Give from my people a Vizier to
my brother Aaron, fortify him with my strength, and have him participate in my
authority. The Almohad were happy with this decree. 311

Huici Miranda saw this for what it was, an adept political maneuver to not only further
concentrate Abd al-Mu’min’s strength, but also to position his son, whom he sent as the
ambassador that the Arabs requested, to succeed him as king.312
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Abd al-Mu’min and the subsequent caliphs, granted the Arab tribes autonomy and
control over their own troops;313 they were often mentioned in battle formations as
separated and earned a reputation as fierce and tactically-strong combatants.314 Their
practice of torna-fuye (attack and retreat) constituted an exercise to lure the enemy to
pursue them as they feigned retreat, spread their troops, and in the ensuing melee, double
back and attack.315 Their remuneration consisted of money, material, and their portion of
the booty, but they were not paid in land, accentuating the fact that they were more
nomadic than the Almohad troops.316 For example, in the reunion mentioned in the
previous section, where Abd al Mu’min conducted an assembly after his victory in
Ifriqiya, he distributed specific amounts of pay among his troops:317
Table 5. Example of Almohad Payment to Almohad and Arab Soldiers
Almohad Soldiers

Payment

Armed Horsemen

10 dinars

Semi Armed Horsemen

8 dinars

Armed Infantry

5 dinars

Semi Armed Infantry

3 dinars

Arab Soldiers
Armed Horsemen

25 dinars

Semi Armed Horsemen

15 dinars

Infantry

7 dinars

Arab Sheikhs

50 dinars

Arab Leaders

100 dinars

Aguilar, “Aportación de los árabes nómadas,” 400.
Ibid., 409. See also Ramírez del Rio, “Documentos sobre el papel de los árabes Hilalies en el al-Andalus
Almohade: traducción y análisis,” 361-362.
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What provides more insight than the absolute amount of the soldiers’ wages, was
that the Arab fighters received double that of the Almohad. This confirms the more
mercenary and precarious nature of the Almohad relationship with the Arab tribes. Abd
al-Mu’min understood this relationship; he did not expect the same level of ideological
fervor that he did from the Almohad, and was well aware that the Arabs could be a
disruptive force if not compensated as expected. 318
The Arabs participated in every major battle that the Almohad fought, in
particular in al-Andalus, and this underscores their importance to the Almohad military
efforts. On route to al-Andalus to the battle of Alarcos the Arab tribes committed 130,000
men, between cavalry and foot soldiers, and the caliph Al-Mu’min ordered his son, Abu
Ya’qub Yusuf, to guide them across the straits.319 Regardless of the potential
exaggeration of this figure, even at half this amount, these troops provided a significant
commitment to the campaign and indicate the importance the Arab tribes represented to
the war efforts of the Almohad. This relationship was characterized by Idhari as a
precarious balancing act and the Almohad, cognizant that the Arabs were difficult to
manage, did not always hold them in the highest esteem. 320
The argument amongst historians is whether, as Huici Miranda opined, Abd alMu’min had compromised the purity of his cause by incorporating the Arabs; or
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alternatively, whether Abd al-Mu’min made the necessary and expedient choice. It
should be argued that the latter was the case. After bringing the Arabs under submission,
not coopting them into the Almohad fold would have left them to fight another day in
Ifriqiya. Because Abd al-Mu’min came from one of the smallest tribes of the movement,
the leverage of an additional, non-aligned group provided his most obvious choice. Even
when the empire collapsed, and the Arabs went their own way, the cause of the dynasty’s
demise could not be laid at their feet. As will be shown, they may have accelerated the
fall of a weakened regime, but they were not the cause.
In the last twenty years, our understanding of the Almohad has improved
immensely, in particular through the increased study of their rich cultural heritage.
Additionally, the explanation that their decline came from internecine family disputes has
been routinely cited. What remains less explored are three aspects that led to their
precipitous fall. First, little has been written to directly link the populating mechanism of
the northern kingdoms in Extremadura and other conquered areas to the Almohad
decline. This aspect, which took longer to develop than the more oft-studied specific
battles, has been under appreciated. Second, as mentioned, the internecine conflicts of the
descendants of Abd al-Mu’min has been documented, but there is little comment on how
the fundamental divisions between the Masmuda and the Zenata, within the Almohad,
created irreparable fault lines. And finally, minimal work has been completed on what
influence economic decline and mismanagement had on the demise of the Almohad
empire. These three aspects, which now will be reviewed, were interconnected and are
critical to understanding the negative reinforcing cycle that led to their decline.
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Chapter 5: The Fall
5.1. Rise of The North
Save the momentary exception of Las Navas de Tolosa, it would be misleading to
imply that the Christian kingdoms were aligned versus the Almohad enemy. Castile was
still at odds with León, and Navarra constantly looked over its shoulder at both Aragon
and Castile as potential usurpers of its territory. However, Castile represented a much
stronger kingdom than it had been a century before, as was Aragon. The Almohad were
threatened by a different enemy at the turn of the thirteenth century than the Almoravid
had faced. Five variables had changed for the Northern Christian kingdoms since the
Almoravid victory at Sagrajas, and although none of these phenomena taken separately
would alter the configuration of the Iberia, when aggregated, they created a formidable
front against the Almohad.
5.1.1 Fall of Toledo and Zaragoza; Lessons Learned
First, the fall of Toledo (1085) and Zaragoza (1118), which occurred before the
Almohad arrival, had moved the defensive border of Iberian Christendom from the Douro
to the Tagus river, incorporating a large portion of Extremadura into Christian hands.
This not only increased the kingdoms’ tax base, but also the man-power available to
them. The Christians had gained valuable experience from their many skirmishes and
humiliating losses at Sagrajas and Los Arcos. These wounds had not healed and Christian
chroniclers still referenced these defeats a hundred years later. The lessons Alfonso VIII
of Castile learned from his losses did not improve his military approach to the battlefield,
but convinced him to avoid mistakes by making fundamental political and logistical
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maneuvers to support his plans. Two examples are worth mentioning. First, he
maximized the benefits that his fellow monarchs could provide while minimizing any
potential interference. He financed the participation at Las Navas of his cash-poor cousin,
Pedro II of Aragon, and more importantly, he married his daughter, Berenguela, to
Alfonso IX of León and negotiated a truce with him at Cabreros in 1206.321 By the time
of Las Navas, Pope Innocent III had forced the couple to annul their union based on
consanguinity; nevertheless, the marriage must have engendered some good will, along
with the five children it produced, for although Alfonso IX did not participate at Las
Navas, he did not join the Almohad cause as he had in the past. Additionally, in 1207
Alfonso VIII resolved the long-standing quarrel with Navarre by the treaty of
Guadalajara; and in 1209 a peace was agreed to between Navarre and Aragon322 because
Alfonso, through separate agreements, eliminated his threat to their sovereignties. The
second major change that Alfonso VIII made was that he leveraged the growing strength
of the church to help manage his kingdom and fight the Almohad. Innocent III’s bull of
February 1212 that called for an Iberian crusade, supported Alfonso VIII and separately,
Innocent exhorted Alfonso IX of Leon to refrain from intervening or to establish new
truces with the Almohad.323
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5.1.2 Support of the Church
The Catholic monarchs of Northern Spain opportunistically adhered to papal
demands. Rome’s expectations concerning marriages, divorces, and the restrictions
against alliances with the Muslim south were all heeded inconsistently, and only as they
suited their specific dynastic needs. However, in the instances where the needs and
demands of the church coincided with those of the Spanish monarchs the result could
create positive outcomes for both parties. The best example of this concurrence was Las
Navas de Tolosa, where the Bishop de Rada not only coordinated with Rome to cajole
additional support for Castile from its northern Christian neighbors, but the local church
also provided funding for the campaign. 324
Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, in his Historia de los hechos de España, provided a
first-hand account of the rise of the northern Christian kingdoms and the coordination
between church and state. He was the son of a noble family who had served the crowns of
Navarre and Castile; his father had served Alfonso VIII, and he, Rodrigo, would become
Alfonso’s trusted advisor. 325 Alfonso became Rodrigo’s sponsor within Castile, and he
nominated him to be the archbishop of Osma, and later Toledo, which was confirmed by
Innocent III on March 13, 1209. In this role Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada became the
emissary between Castile and Rome,326 and as the archbishop of the southern-most

Jiménez de Rada, Historia de los hechos de España, 23-25. “También estuvieron allí presentes los
obispos, que aportaron a la empresa de la fe tanto sus personas como sus haciendas, según se la dio Dios,
colaborando espontáneamente en los gastos y responsabilidades.”
325 Ibid. 18-19.
326 Ibid., 19.
324

114

stronghold of Castile he experienced first-hand the threats and opportunities provided by
this border position.
In many ways, Rodrigo was pivotal to the success at Las Navas de Tolosa.
Alfonso VIII longed to revenge his loss at Los Arcos; however, without the services of
Rodrigo, this may never have been accomplished. Rodrigo, on his first visit to Rome in
1210, advocated that the pope declare a crusade in Spain, and subsequently, he became
the emissary of the pope and Castile to southern France, where he continued to lobby for
support for an Iberian crusade.327 If the conservative wing of Spanish historians such as
Alborñoz were ever looking for a standard bearer for their position, Rodrigo was such a
person.
From the Pyrenees and from sea to sea and from the ocean to the Mediterranean.
They also came from the province of Narbonne which belong to the Visigoths,
and even more than this, including the ten cities in the province of Africa, called
Tingania. Spain was the truth, as if it were the paradise of God; from its five
principle rivers, notably the Ebro, the Duero, the Tajo, the Guadiana and the
Betis, and from these rivers rise up the mountains. 328
He knew that the Iberian peninsula constituted one entity that had at one point been under
the “reign of the Visigoths, and that the Spaniards were enormous in their amplitude, and
had extended their power from sea to sea.” 329
At Las Navas de Tolosa not only had the kings of Castile, Navarre, and Aragon
assembled, “a Trinity of Power” romantically labeled by Rodrigo, but their clergy as
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well. Rodrigo extoled the generosity of Alfonso in opening up his treasury to equip the
assembled troops,330 and he underscored that the church had helped finance the
expedition. The church had given “as much with their presence as their estates, as God
had given to them, collaborating spontaneously in the costs and responsibilities….”331
How spontaneous this support was is open to debate, yet assuredly Rodrigo demonstrated
commitment, and he, plus the assembled kings, must have applied tremendous pressure
on the church to provide additional resources to reinforce the war effort.
5.1.3 Christian Military Orders
The three additional elements that strengthened the North’s resistance to the
Almohad were related and reinforced each other. The founding of religious military
orders, the granting of community-founding fueros, and population increases represented
variables that tilted in favor of Christian Iberia during the thirteenth century. As regards
the founding of the religious orders, two, the Hospitallers (founded 1099) and the
Templars (founded 1119), were not indigenous to Spain; however, their presence was
welcomed and taken advantage of by the kingdoms of Iberia. Ramon Berenger III joined
the Templars in 1130332 and recall that Innocent III had entrusted Jaime I to the care of
the Templars until he reached his majority, when he would employ them extensively in
his conquest of Valencia (1232). 333 The Templars enjoyed an especially strong historical
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relationship with the Catalan nobility, and at least three of them had reached the position
of Grand Master of the Order.334 They also had a presence in Portugal and were said to be
present at the Battle of Santarém in 1147, where they helped Alfonso I defeat the
Almohad.335
The Spanish military orders of Calatrava (1158) in Castile, Santiago (1170) in
Leon, and of Alcantara (1166) in Portugal were newly consecrated in the second half of
the twelfth century. Calatrava, the eponymous city of the Order where it was founded,
was predominant along the Tagus river, the Castilian border with Muslim Spain. The
Orders became incentivized to conquer territory as they were granted the right to possess
and inherit any castles they could take from the Muslims.336 For example, by 1188,
Calatrava had accumulated under its control and protection 340 square miles of
territory;337 Alfonso VIII added to this sum after his defeat at Alarcos by granting them
Albalat, Santa Cruz, Cabañas, and Suruela in 1195.338
The nascent military orders were not originally as organized as they would be
after Alarcos. It was only after this battle that Alfonso VIII, in conjunction with the
Orders, began to build a strong defensive vertebrae along the Tagus river so that by the
time of Las Navas, fifteen years later, it constituted a more substantial front.339 Carlos
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Ayala makes the convincing argument that in the liminal period before Alarcos, Alfonso
thought of the outposts along the Muslim border tactically; but after his defeat he was
shocked into the realization that it was essential to incorporate the Orders into the
political fabric of the realm and provide them with increased political and monetary
support.340 The ongoing payments made by Alfonso VIII to the orders support this
notion; before 1195 only one payment larger than 400 maravedis was made, whereas
from 1195 onward five separate installments of 3,000 maravedis or more were paid to the
Orders. These payments, made annually, were contracted for a period of ten years
each.341 The military orders after Alarcos became more efficient, more centrally
controlled, and developed a “institutionalized network of jurisdictions” that included
castles, churches, and a trading structure.342
The number of troops garrisoned in any one location were most likely small; one
such example, available from the record of Templars at the castle of Castellote, housed
only ten members.343 However, one instance in 1198 when the Calatrava sallied out with
400 knights and 700 foot soldiers to raid the Muslim area of Manzanares and eventually
captured the castle at Salvatierra, provides an example of how their strength could be
aggregated when necessary.344 On the other hand, because many of the fueros and towns
taken were fortified by castles, a contingent of twenty men could defend these positions
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for an extended period of time. Calatrava may have only had 1,200-2,000 knights, but
through these they controlled much territory as previously mentioned, and would enjoin
the local populations for defensive and offensive purposes. At their height, Calatrava
controlled over fifty-six commandries, sixteen priories, and sixty-four villages, all of
which contained a population of 200,000.345
5.1.4 Encroachment of Fueros
The fourth strength that aided the Christian kingdoms was the initiation of fueros.
Fueros represented community land grants made by the monarchs that allowed either
military orders or small nobles, in conjunction with peasants, to found or join a particular
town with the express intention to represent the crown in a defensive position against
Muslim aggression.346 The first documented fuero was the “Fuero de León” under
Alfonso V (r. 999-1028) in 1017.347 Powers, in his A Society Organized for War: The
Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284,348 details how
Alfonso VI (r. 1072-1109), fully aware of the nature of border wars, encouraged the
frontier settlements to expand southward. Alfonso had experienced the elation of taking
Toledo in 1085, only to suffer an ignoble defeat at Sagrajas a year later, and this in turn
began to accelerate his fuero grants. He granted Logroño (1095), Miranda de Ebro
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(1099), and Vallunquera (1102) in succession. The Aragonese, paying attention to this
strategy, were quick to do the same, granting fueros to Babastro (1100), Caparroso
(1102), and Santacara (1102). 349
Figure 7. Map of Fueros Established (not all included) 350

Many of the early fuero grants were given for northern cities; however, recall that
at the time of Alfonso VI, Zaragoza still had not fallen and Toledo, almost impregnable,
represented the lone Christian-held city south of the Duero river. A defensive strategy by
the crown clearly was required as between 1090 and 1137 Toledo was attacked over ten
times.351 Alfonso understood that Toledo, as a bridgehead, proved much too vulnerable
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and began to settle lands in Extremadura to shore up this isolated outpost. His French
son-in-law, Raymond of Burgundy, became a champion of this process and settled Avila
in 1087, followed in quick succession by Segovia (1088), Salamanca (1100), and Soria
(1110).352
Much has been made of the fuero of Cuenca (1190) that allowed outlaws and
adventurers’ crimes to be forgiven if they settled in the area. 353 This reveals that the
monarchs understood that these border outposts were not for the faint of heart and some
flexibility as to character needed to be tolerated. The most dangerous territories, such as
Ucles, Mora, Oreja, and Ocaña, existed between the Tagus and the Guadiana rivers and
Calatrava and the Hospitaller were granted lands in these areas. 354 The fueros required
military service of the inhabitants, not only in the settlers’ defense of their own towns,
but missions that could venture further south. Subsequent fueros in Cáseda,
Caracastillow, and Encisa, granted in 1129, had more specific, if not stringent regulations
in their agreements and required that at least 30 percent of able-bodied men answer the
call to arms when demanded, and for this, distribution of booty was also meticulously
detailed.355
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This was a time, pre-Las Navas in particular, when social mobility increased and
a man with a horse and a saddle might make a name for himself and earn his way up the
social ladder.356 Villar Garcia’s analysis of place names from outside of Castile into
newly settled regions within Castile suggest a society with significant mobility and
colonization. The place names, established from 1085 and 1157, between the Duero and
the Tagus rivers, represented fifty-two newly-named towns with antecedents from areas
such as Aragon and Navarra. 357 This supports the idea that the attraction of owning and
passing on land to their families, for lower levels of society, was substantial.358 In his
work, Colección de fueros municipales de los pueblos de Castilla, León, Aragon y
Navarra, Don José Maria Alonso documented over seventy fueros granted before the
time of Las Navas.359 Powers believes that in the post-Alarcos period the Muslim
advance, blunted by the fuero towns of the Tajo Valley and La Mancha, influenced their
decision to sue for a peace even after their major victory.360
The granting of fueros can be considered in two phases. The first, the expansion
from the Ebro to the Duero river, could be regarded as occurring in a more democratic
spirit as discussed above. This was particularly true before Las Navas, when the Almohad
constituted a more precarious threat. During the second stage, after Las Navas, fueros
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were typically granted to noble landowners that expanded and developed more largescale operations.361 Bisson underscores that “the counts of Barcelona and the Kingdoms
of Aragon, Navarre and Leon… could count on alliances with great lords investing
profitably in the spoils of conquest.”362 The fuero expansion represents one such example
that included not only noble participation but the lower levels of society as well.
F IG U R E S A N D T A B L E S

Figure 8. Map of the Contested Tagus River 363

Expansion became tied to a disciplined tax regime in which the crown would exact
payment (fonasdera) from all non-participants in military campaigns.364 In his exhaustive
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work of Castile’s management of their economy, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla
(1252-1369), Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada details how the Iberian Christian kings
would forgive military service in exchange for taxes. This work also specifies the
ongoing negotiation between nobles and monarchs regarding the quinto real (the royal 20
percent) which could be negotiated or forgiven during expansion into Muslim territory.
While he documents a period later than discussed in this paper; Ladero verifies that many
of these taxation policies were built from rules developed in the early thirteenth
century.365
5.1.5 Population Growth and Control
The fifth pillar that strengthened the North, one being explored by economists but
not as actively by historians, was the change in population. Europe and Spain nearly
doubled their populations in the years between 1000-1300.366

Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252-1369) (Madrid, Real
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Table 6. Medieval Population in Iberia and the Maghreb (M) 367

Year

1000

1100

1200

1300

Spain
Portugal
Tot. Iberia

4.0
0.6
4.6

4.5
0.7
5.2

5.5
0.9
6.4

7.5
1.2
8.7

Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Tot. Maghreb

2.0
2.0
1.0
5.0

2.0
2.0
1.0
5.0

2.0
2.0
1.0
5.0

2.0
2.0
1.0
5.0

Accordingly, both the Muslim rulers of al-Andalus and the northern kingdoms enjoyed
increased manpower and the economic activity that it engendered. However, by the year
1200 the North had steadily expanded southward and the amount of population under
control of the Christian kingdoms and the Islamic south was essentially equal.368
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368
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Figure 9. Evolution of Medieval Spanish and European Population

By some estimates, at the beginning of the taifa period less than 75,000 Christians
lived in cities in Iberia whereas the Muslim population living in urban environments
represented almost half a million.369 By the year 1200, Christian and Muslim populations
are estimated to be equally urbanized. A closer look at the largest urban centers of Iberia
(see appendix, Figure 10 for pop. of all cities) demonstrates that both Muslim––and
Christian––controlled cities gained population; however, the share of Iberia’s urban
population controlled by Christian monarchs increased dramatically from 16% in 1000 to

Ibid., 379. This study also controlled for other variables and determined that “This is our second main
result: the effect of the Reconquest on urban shares vanishes once we control for a time trend. Taken
together, these two findings suggest that, although the Reconquest seemed to have had an initial negative
impact on the urban shares of these cities, this effect was just temporary…. Then we estimate the average
effect on the urban shares of our sample of Iberian cities by using city-specific time dummies, finding that
cities regained their pre-Reconquest urban share in less than one hundred years” (92-96).
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39% in 1200, with over 70% of this change being explained by the capture of Toledo and
Zaragoza.370
Table 7. Urban Population Change in Iberia Between
1000 and 1200
1000

1200

%Chg.

Total Iberian Urban Pop.

509

619

22%

Christian Controlled
Urban Pop. Pre 1000

83

107

29%

Christian Reconquest
Urban Pop.
Total Christian
Controlled Urban Pop.
Muslim Controlled
Urban Pop.

124

135

9%

207

242

17%

426

377

-12%

% Muslim Control
Urban Pop. 1000
% Christian Control
Urban Pop. 1000
% Muslim Control
Urban Pop. 1200
% Christian Control
Urban Pop. 1200

84%
16%
61%
39%

While speculative and deserving of more research, it is not illogical to assume that the tax
benefit of this increased population and urbanization would have improved the Christian
monarchs’ ability to combat their Muslim adversaries. The data underscore that in the
year 1000 the Maghreb and Iberia had the same population base from which to draw

See Table 10 in the appendix for a city by city analysis of which urban centers switched from Berber to
Christian control from 1086-1212.
370
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resources, but by 1200, not only had the total population in Iberia grown substantially
higher than the Maghreb, but the Christians’ relative share in Iberia had increased by over
100%. Bernard F. Reilly goes as far as to hypothesize that by the time of Las Navas the
Muslim rural population may have been “hollowed out” with all the fighting and may
have emigrated to Granada or the Maghreb.371
Figure 10. Map of Major Medieval Cities of Iberia 372

These territorial and population trends must have aided the founding of the
military Christian orders and the populating of fueros. A more recent study by the
economist Daniel Oto-Perlías373 makes the compelling argument that “frontier warfare
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favors a colonization of the territory characterized by low settlement and high population
concentration.”374 He argues that these battle-challenged frontiers encouraged welldefined strategic positions (castles); livestock over agriculture as “mobile assets were
easier to protect; and that the fueros along the Tagus represented a defensive vanguard
with well-defined boundaries.375 Taking the earliest census data available and
extrapolating to the past, Oto-Perlías demonstrates a stark line built across the Tagus river
where medieval fueros were granted.376
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Figure 11. Settlement Density above the Duero River

Although the exact figures for the number of knights, soldiers, and population elude
historians, it is clear that the relative manpower gains had swung in favor of the Christian
North and aided their effective defense and aggression versus the Almohad.377
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930860

5.2 Las Navas de Tolosa: “Causa de la ruina del Andalus…” 378
The purpose of employing Las Navas de Tolosa as a pivot point for the Almohad
decline is not to emphasize their military deficiencies. Rodrigo de Rada379 and Ibn
Idhari380 believed, as did Huici and O’Callaghan, that the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa
signaled the beginning of the end for the Almohad in Spain. This represented the moment
when “the balance of power…tipped decidedly in favor of the Christians.”381 Al-Nasir’s
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32

loss at Las Navas should not be construed as a militarily defeat, per se, but a culmination
of bad choices under non-ideal circumstances, that a stronger leader could have survived.
The earlier loss at Santarém in 1184 provides an excellent example; not only had the
Almohad been defeated, but their caliph, Abu Ya’qub Yusuf , was killed. Al-Nasir’s
father, al-Mansur (r. 1184-1199), was the successor that managed to hold the empire
together for another fifteen years under these trying circumstances before being
succeeded by his young son.
Al-Nasir inherited the kingdom at a very young age (ten years old), and he was
only nineteen when he travelled to the Battle of Las Navas in al-Andalus. Ominously, on
the eve of al-Nasir’s departure (Nov. 1210) a disastrous fire occurred in Marrakech. This
proved to be not only a bad omen, it also depleted all the supplies of the market of the
Almohad capital and it is probable that it negatively affected the confidence of a
superstitious populace.382 Al-Nasir believed that this fire may have been started by
dissident tribes and suspects were rounded up and executed. 383 But the damage was done
and as related by Idhari most of the merchandise in the market place had gone up like “a
candlewick in a lamp.” This must have increased the strain on supplying the troop train
headed north and was further exacerbated by mismanagement of supplies when, upon
Nasir’s arrival to the northern coast, it was discovered that the royal warehouses were
empty. This caused inflation in the marketplace and hunger of his troops. Nasir castigated
those responsible, but the erosion of confidence had already begun.384 Idhari documents
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that punishment was meted out for the fire in Marrakech and for the supply chain
mistakes,385 which leads one to believe that either someone sabotaged al-Nasir’s success
or that he may have blamed innocent people. Idhari makes clear that the lack of supplies
became dire and there was fear of troops “disappearing” from the ranks.386 For the
enlisted men, regardless of the reasons for supply shortfalls, it would have been difficult
not to lose confidence and hold their leader responsible for these mishaps.
A logistical obstacle that Huici Miranda underscores was simply travel time and
distance: al-Nasir would traverse 1,500 kilometers to reach the battlefield, which he did
over the course of fifteen months, with skirmishes and smaller battles in between.
Alfonso VIII, conversely, would move his troop train less than 20 percent of this
distance, and it took only twenty days to arrive at the engagement. 387 The stress of travel
and the supply chain shortages must have taken its toll, and Ibn Idhari explains that the
“Almohad did not strive very hard in this battle and they were not sincere in their efforts
on account of the castigation they had received from al-Nasir.”388 This was further
exacerbated by the lack of payment of his troops. The Almohad chronicler, Abd alWahid, his work completed only twelve years after the event, provided this background
to the battle:
The main reason for this defeat was the divisions in the heart of the Almohads. In
the time of Abu Yusuf Ya’qub they drew their pay every four months without fail.
But in the time of this Abu Abd-Allah [al-Nasir] and especially during this
particular campaign, their payment was in arrears. They attributed this to the
Ibid., 260-261.
Ibid., 262.
387 Huici Miranda, Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista durante las invasiones africanas (Almorávides,
Almohades y Benimerines), 229.
388Ibn Idhari al-Marrakusi, Al-Bayan al-Mugrib, 269. “…sólo que los Almohades no se esforzaron en esta
campaña y no fueron sinceros en ella a causa del castigo impuesto por su emir al-Nasir a sus jeques,
matándolos y exterminándolos por mano del encargado de ello…”
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viziers and rebelled in disgust. I have from several of them that they did not draw
their swords nor train their spears, they did not take any part in the preparations
for battle. With this in mind, they fled at the first assault of the Franks.389
Al-Nasir’s leadership was not aided by his youthful, blue-eyed, blond haired
appearance with a reputation for avarice and ruthlessness.390 Idhari inserts an out-ofsequence story into the middle of his battle preparation narrative: two sheikhs of Ceuta
and Fez were “decapitated in cold blood” by order of the caliph one month before the
conflict. Idhari states that these executions provided “a motive for reflection for the
thinker and a warning for the carefree,” implying that this occurrence preoccupied and
disconcerted the assembled troops.391 The circumstances would have challenged the most
seasoned of leaders, but maintaining order among men asked to follow a non-battle-tested
youth, that had not provided adequate food nor pay, with a bad omen in his wake (the fire
of Marrakech), explains the lack of commitment documented by the Arab chroniclers.
Reading between the lines, one could surmise that al-Nasir’s leadership skills, coupled
with hard traveling, food shortages, and lack of remuneration, logically would have led to
desertions and a less than enthusiastic showing of the Almohad troops at Las Navas de
Tolosa.
Huici Miranda acknowledges that little strategy was involved in open field battles
such as Las Navas.392 The main decisions entailed which day to attack and how to
assemble troops, both of which led to the all-important issue of number of fighting men.
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No mention of surprise attacks or securing the higher ground at Las Navas is mentioned
in the narratives; both armies were well aware of the other’s position. What remains clear
from the detailed chronicle of Rodrigo de Rada, is that Alfonso and Rodrigo planned this
battle for two years and both opened their coffers to attract and maintain the armies
assembled.
While the nobles and people of the kings of Castile and Aragón assembled, the
noble king of Castile provided sufficiently for all the expenses of everyone who
had come from Poitou, Gascony, and Provence, and from other regions, and of the
king of Aragón himself. Such a quantity of gold was distributed there every day
that the counters and the weighers could scarcely reckon the multitude of coins
necessary for expenses. At the king’s request, all the clergy of the kingdom of
Castile had granted one-half of all their revenues that year to the lord king. 393
Alfonso promised to outfit 2,000 knights with their squires, 10,000 sergeants on
horseback, and up to 100,000 foot-soldiers, not to mention the support train behind
them.”394 This largess must have attracted more men and by definition confirms a better
planned attack than the slap-dash performance at Sagrajas and the impatience of Alarcos.
The significance of founding and utilizing the military orders became apparent at Las
Navas as the orders of Calatrava, Santiago, the Temple, and the Hospital were present,395
although they represented less than ten percent of the assembled troops.396
From the reports above we may also speculate that perhaps, for the first time, the
Almohad were outnumbered. Recall that before leaving the shores of Ceuta supplies were
short and the troops were hungry. At Alarcos the Bishop de Rada reported that al-Nasir’s
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father had assembled “an infinite army, a crowd like the grains of sands of the sea,”397 but
Jiménez de Rada made no such reference at Las Navas. Ibn Idhari relates in al-Bayan that
at Las Navas there were more Christian troops assembled than had been in hundreds of
years.398 Huici Miranda, the historian who conducted the most in-depth analysis of this
battle, speculated that the Muslims had 100,000 combatants and the Christians only
60,000, although both these numbers seem elevated.399 Contrarily, Rodrigo de Rada
mentioned above that Alfonso had provisioned over 112,000 men. Rodrigo’s number
could be exaggerated; however, compared to previous battles, the Christian soldier count
versus the Almohad, on a relative basis at minimum, had assuredly improved. Troop
counts aside, taking the Almohad and Christian narratives into consideration, most
generals would have opted for a more involved 60,000 troops, than an underfed,
underpaid, and underconfident group of soldiers that may have numbered 100,000.
Las Navas was lost before it began. The lack of leadership and the inability to
overcome bad luck or sabotage doomed this enterprise before it left the shores of Ceuta.
However, it also underscores the fragility of the Almohad governing apparatus. The
Almohad created a family enterprise and the individual who led the dynasty could instill
confidence or apathy in his followers. With an increasingly aggressive northern foe,
military action was demanded of a king. Even if the governing substrate remained in
place, the inability to confront the enemy and achieve victory undermined the legitimacy
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of the empire and the ability to promise rewards. Al-Nasir’s lack of control of his supply
chain and the inability to pay his troops reinforces the importance of managing the
Almohad economy and its influence on military victories. Al-Nasir would not survive his
defeat; he made it back to Marrakech only to die under mysterious circumstances. “Only
God knows the truth of what happen” relates Idhari. 400
5.3 Loss of Control of the Arab Tribes
It appears that the first group of the coalition who understood that the Almohad
power was beginning to wane were the Arab tribes, who, as previously mentioned, were
integral to the Almohad advance in Iberia. Abd al-Mu’min had negotiated away some
control when he contracted with these tribes, but he understood that they were as capable
as they were mercenary. The Arabs must have sensed that as the Christian states pushed
further south, the Almohad would be unable to support their monetary demands,
demonstrating again the link between geographic control and economics. After the
debilitating loss of Las Navas the Arab tribes began ransacking towns and demanding
tribute outside of Seville, undermined Almohad authority and frightened their would-be
supporters.401 In the Maghreb, they dispersed into separate groups, fending for
themselves and backing various factions and extracting compensation for their support.402
The Almohad had taken advantage of the Arab strengths, but after the collapse at Las
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Navas, the Arabs sowed anarchy in both Andalusia and the Maghreb often fighting for
opposing sides of internal dynastic conflicts. 403
5.4 War on Four Fronts versus a Family Dynasty
The Almohad attempted to build an empire on the foundation of their proto state.
The Maghreb, Ifriqiya, the Balearic Islands, and al-Andalus each presented specific
challenges; and the Iberian kingdoms of Ibn Mardanis, Aragon, Castile-Leon, and
Portugal all posed threats that had to be reacted to and managed. Initially, the Almohad
had subdued the Maghreb and this represented their center. On the near periphery, they
had conquered Ifriqiya and coopted the Arab tribes; however, intermittent threats from
the Ibn Ghaniya of the Balearics continued.404 This would be partly resolved when the
Almohad conquered three areas. First, upon the death of Ibn Mardanis (1172), Murcia
summitted; second, the last of the Almoravid were conquered when the Balearic islands
fell in 1203; and third, the resubmission of Ifriqiya in 1206. With this geographically
consolidation, the Almohad rose to the apotheosis of their power. 405
Abd al-Mu’min should be credited for creating this empire, but he also
established a familial dynasty which proved to be contrary to a lasting state. He had
concentrated power around his family and slowly unwound the integrated network
originally established by Ibn Tumart, thus weakening any possibility of cross-pollination
between tribes. The centralization of the Almohad administration contrast to what had
occurred under the Almoravid where annual jihads against the Christian kingdoms were
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conducted on a regional basis. The Almohad had created a scenario whereby the caliph
himself would conduct jihad but controlled the troops centrally. In one sense this
performed as a powerful propaganda tool to communicate the caliph’s commitment to
jihad; however, each region lost its ability to respond quickly to Northern aggression.406
The Andalusian philosopher and historian, Al Turtusi (1059-1127), represents one of the
few Islamic historians to directly comment on this issue, and he attributed the loss of alAndalus to the contraction of regional governmental involvement and less fiscal support
from the central government: “Our sultans saved money and lost soldiers. This resulted in
the Christians having a reserve of soldiers and the Muslims having a reserve of currency,
and in the end, this lead to them subduing and being triumphant over us.” 407
Because the Almohad had established a familial dynasty, the regional powers
were almost exclusively run by contenders to the throne, which engendered “kings in
waiting” should the caliph falter. Even Abu Ya’qub Yusuf (r. 1163-1184), one of the
most celebrated caliphs of the Almohad, had to fend off his two siblings for power. These
brothers, the governors of Cordoba and Bugia, remained the last to recognize his
sovereignty, and only after lengthy negotiations. After finally giving this recognition, his
brother from Bugia decided to visit Abu Ya’qub Yusuf in Marrakech, only to be met by
an untimely death on route.408 These family dynamics undoubtedly conspired to the
undoing of al-Nasir (r. 1199-1213).
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Al-Nasir was replaced by his son, Abu Ya’qub al-Mustansir (1213-1224), himself
between ten to fifteen years old. By all accounts al-Mustansir was characterized by weak
leadership and never left the palace in Marrakech unless it was to visit Tinmal, thus
forfeiting the pageantry strength of the caliphate.409 Abu Ya’qub al-Mustansir was
dominated by his uncles and two Almohad sheikhs410 and Khaldun states that “as a
philosophy of government it had ended in the 1220s and 1230s in conflict between the
dynasty of Abd al-Mu’min and the shaykhs of the Masmuda who formed the aristocracy
of the movement.”411 This increased influence of the ulema coupled with the division
between tribal chiefs, would lead to the assassinations of the two caliphs succeeding alMustansir, as each group vied for influence. 412 An interesting aside was that neither of
these puerile kings had been scion of inter-married tribes. Both of their mothers had been
Christian slaves and as a result they could only count on agnatic support of their reign.
There would be no Urraca (who maintained Castile until Alfonso VII reached his
majority) or the Nazfa, Abd Rahman I mother’s tribe, to save these Almohad caliphs.413
The Almohad had the opposite problem of the northern Christian dynasties. In
contrast, Alfonso I The Battler, who willed his kingdom to Rome because of his lack of
an heir, Abd al-Mu’min had eighteen legitimate sons, who could, and often did, vie for
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Refer to section 4.4.1.1 of this paper for more detail.
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411 Michael Brett, Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 3. See also Ibn Idari
al-Marrakusi, Al-Bayan al-Mugrib, 211, Huici’s commentary.
412 Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 98.
413 Abd al-Wahid Al-Marrakusi, Colección de crónicas árabes de la Reconquista volumen iv, 254, 268.
409

139

power or turn into meddling uncles, in attempt to control the caliph.414 The Almohad state
could not survive two weak, inexperienced leaders in succession, and the decline began
in 1212 under al-Nasir and only accelerated under al-Mustansir.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
There were parallels to the final stages of the Almohad empire to those of the
Almoravid. The Christian kingdoms had pushed the Almoravid south taking Toledo and
Zaragoza and this steady advance had not slowed during the reign of the Almohad. The
Almoravid had to confront the revolt of a tribal confederation in the Maghreb, the
Almohad, just as the Almohad resisted the Marinids. The last two heirs of both kingdoms
were too young and inexperienced and in some ways conformed to Ibn Khaldun’s model
of dynastic decline. However, the Almohad collapse can be traced to three interrelated
problems, that if not unique to their rule, certainly were more intense than the Almoravid
had experienced. First, their northern Christian neighbors had instituted political and
military measures to support their territorial gains and increased their tax base, making
them a more formidable opponent than the Almoravid had faced. Second, the Berber
tribal system gave priority to agnatic progeniture succession over ability, thereby failing
to provide a consistent mechanism to contain or reverse revolts when two weak leaders
succeeded each other. Again, this would be similar to what the Almoravid experienced
but was exacerbated in the case of the Almohad by the rule of a minority tribe, the
Zenata, over the majority Masmuda. Third, and most importantly, the declining economy
aggravated the internal fissures within the kingdom. This was intensified for the Almohad
for three reasons. First they had a larger empire to manage than the Almoravid. Second,
they would lose all revenue from al-Andalus. And finally, the resources of gold
production and agriculture, internal to the Maghreb economy, would both decline under
their rule.
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6.1 Stronger Northern Enemy
In the face of their own political weakness, the Almohad had a northern enemy
who through many incremental steps presented a more formidable and integrated foe than
the Almoravid, had faced one hundred years earlier. The northern kingdoms, through
slow but steady development of a fuero network, immigration, and new military orders,
gained and controlled more territory and were in a strong position to resist the Almohad
advance. Some of this southward encroachment stemmed from a natural frontier
mentality that men possessed on both sides of the Tagus river; however, some decisions,
such as developing fueros and military orders, were proactively taken by the northern
monarchs, with the support of the nobility and the church, which provided them an
enlarged tax base that ensured their financial advantage over the Almohad.
6.2 Tribal Conflict and a War on Four Fronts
The Almohad built many of the foundations of a central state in the Maghreb and
assembled an empire and herein lies one of their problems. Attempting to control four
geographic regions while confronting five different enemies would have been a challenge
for any state, medieval or otherwise, but to manage an empire of this size without a
standing army made this task more difficult. This challenge was exacerbated by what
Glick called “a social system [where] instability at the dynastic level is normal and
expected because tribal political life takes the form of a constant testing of forces.” 415
Glick further explains that the clan is the basic Berber unit that lives and fights together.
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Each group would come together for a joint cause, but in many ways they fought and
lived quarantined from each other with little group adhesion.416
The Moroccan historian Abdullah Laroui, in his History of the Maghreb, posits
that what is often viewed as a strength, namely the Almohad ability to repress successive
rebellions, in particular those of the brothers of Ibn Tumart and the Ibn Ghaniya in
Ifriqiya, was in fact a weakness. He argues that these rebellions provide a clear sign that
the population was not supportive of the Almohad regime. 417 Abun-Nasr concurs with
Laroui, and emphasizes that the first three strong caliphs were able to subdue revolts
among the larger Masmuda tribes; however, al-Nasir and al-Mustansir’s weakness invited
insurrection.418 The tribal group of Abd al-Mu’min, the Kumiya, were part of the Zenata
federation of tribes and their leadership was resented by the larger Masmuda tribal group.
García offers the hypothesis that the Almohad Masmuda cooperated with Abd al-Mu’min
at Tinmal only because they had no choice. 419 Once the tribes descended from the
mountains, controlled the economy, and gained more resources under the first three
caliphs, cohesion dissipated and opened the door for tribal divisions, particularly in the
face of weaker leadership and a deteriorating economy.
Gellner spoke of the inherent conflict of Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy: tribes had
social cohesion, but that only cities had civilization. Once a state attempted to be
developed (in the cities), cohesion was often lost.420 The “institutionalized dissidence”
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that came from tribes being culturally similar but politically independent created an
environment in which once external threats faded, cohesion and asibiya were lost. What
started as an apparent strength, the co-mingling of tribes, in the end provided a lasting
division. The appointment, or usurpation, of leadership by a member outside the
Masmuda, in this case Abd al-Mu’min, a Zenata, created an irreparable fault line. The
adhesion of the Zenata to the Almohad cause in their military campaigns also provided
them with insight into the strength––and weaknesses––of the Almohad and tempted their
tribal segmentary politics. The disintegration of asibiya may have been particularly acute
in al-Andalus; not only were the rough Berber tribes often looked upon as uncouth and
uncultured, but the Maliki ulema, who had never been fully replaced, resisted the
religious revolution the Almohad had attempted to impose.
6.3 Lack of Transitional Institutions
The Almohad never succeeding in building impersonal state institutions respected
for their final judgements or that received the consistent loyalty of their subjects.421
Strayer in his On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State could easily have been
referencing the Almohad when he wrote:
The vast majority of the subjects of an empire did not believe that the preservation
of the state was the highest social good; in case after case they viewed the
collapse of empires with equanimity, and either reverted to smaller political units
or accepted without protest incorporation in a new empire ruled by a new elite…
But no city-state ever solved the problem of incorporating new territories and new
populations into its existing structure, of involving really large numbers of people
in its political life.422
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Their governing institutions, pressured by the northern Christian dynamic outlined above,
could not tolerate the political and economic implications of a military loss such as Las
Navas and dynastic transitions of power to two puerile, inexperienced monarchs.
The Almohad transitions of power compare unfavorably to the minority of Jaime I
of Aragon, who at the age of five was nurtured through his minority until he was
prepared to lead the consolidated kingdom of Aragon/Catalonia by the church and the
Knights Templar, with the acquiescence of the nobility. In this case, the most powerful
political agents of the age, the Catholic church, supported the candidacy of Jaime I of
Aragon, as did his nobles and the Knights Templar who understood the benefits of
stability. Finally, he had no sibling rival; the only other family member that could have
challenged Jaime was an unpopular great uncle, who was neutralized by Innocent III. AlNasir, on the other hand, had fifteen brothers,423 seventeen uncles,424 and countless
cousins waiting to take his throne. This family threat, coupled with a divided clergy
lacking the institutional strength of the Catholic Church, added to the lack of cross-tribal
cohesion.
6.4 Puerile Kings and Succession
The formula that Khaldun suggested that assured the fourth generation of a
dynasty was doomed to fail was not universally true. The Umayyads had eight transitions
of power. In fact, the most exalted of all the Umayyad kings, Abd al-Rahman III, was a
skip-generation selection, whose grandfather identified him “out of order” and anointed
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him his successor over Abd al-Rahman’s own father and uncles. Abd al-Rahman would
rule the Umayyads for almost forty years and lead them to the height of their glory. An
apologist might argue that the Almohad had a similar system in place. An example of this
occurred during the transition from Abd al-Mu’min to his progenitor and declared
successor, Mohammad. Mohammad had been proclaimed crown prince; however, he was
a profligate drunkard, and as a result he was replaced within two months in a coup
organized by his brother, Ali ibn Yusuf, and his father’s vizier, Ibn Hafs.425 This coup,
cannot be characterized as “a system” but it would never have transpired without the
support of the ulema and the family. However, even in this process, Ali ibn Yusuf,
arguably the most accomplished Almohad caliph, had to negotiate at length with his two
refractory brothers, the governors of Cordoba and Budia, before they recognized his
candidacy.426
6.5 Weakened Economy; The End of the Almohad
The Almohad revenue base in al-Andalus had been halved and was declining.
They could no longer promise additional booty or wealth from the peninsula to their
followers and as a result, the Arab tribes were opportunistically disrupting the economy
and demanding tribute. The economic wealth exploited in al-Andalus at the turn of the
thirteenth century represented a high tide for the Almohad, and when it receded it
revealed an economy that was under threat in the Maghreb as well. Evidence suggests
that the agricultural production had already been weakened by neglect of the Almohad
and was threatened by the rebelling Marinids. When the Marinids first appeared on a
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war-like footing (~1212-1215) they temporarily took one of the central nodes to northsouth trade, Fez, and controlled the outer territories, leaving the Almohad occupying only
the cities by the time of al-Nasir.427 This loss of control of geography outside of the major
cities further explains why al-Mustansir would not travel beyond Tinmal and Marrakech
for fear of his safety.428
Laroui conjectures that the concentration of trade in the coastal cities represented
an indication of the deterioration of the central economy more than of a compensatory
strength, especially in light of the advancing Genoese trade network on both sides of the
Mediterranean littoral.429 He interprets the trade agreements struck with the Italian city
states as a sign of weakness not strength, and opines that the Almohad economy was in
decline even before the time of al-Nasir.430 He believes that the Almohad’s prosperity
came not as a result of their own development of trade, but by spending the accumulated
wealth of the Almoravid and Andalusian princes before them.431 Laroui’s position
appears overstated, as trade between the Genoese and the Almohad-controlled ports
represented as much as 30 percent of the former’s trade. This indicates that the
Almohad’s integration with the greater Mediterranean economy provided more than
enough leverage for an equitable relationship with the Genoese. However, there is a
sliver of evidence that demonstrates that in 1214, only two years after Las Navas, trade
with Ceuta dropped from 13 to 4.2 percent, possibly signaling a disrupted Almohad
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economy, or an early indication of the famine that occurred under al-Mustansir.432 Barely
two years into the rule of al-Mustansir, a deadly famine struck the Maghreb for three
years in (1215-1217) food reserves had been exhausted, and the tribes began to revolt and
disrupt the kingdom. This loss of food reserves further suggests that the Almohad were
mismanaging their agricultural resources. The archeological work of Boone and Benco,
mentioned in section 4.5, supports this view and underscores that the Almohad had begun
to change their economic priorities, emphasizing trade over agriculture. Their lack of
attention to agriculture may also help explain some of the disastrous supply shortages
experienced by al-Nasir during his Las Navas campaign.
Gold production, the financial lifeblood during the rise of both Berber empires,
had declined 90 percent from the time of the first Almohad caliph, Abd al-Mu’min.
Under the Almoravid, gold production averaged 1,222 kilograms per year but had fallen
to the still substantial amount of 629 kilograms annually under Abd al-Mu’min. These
levels would collapse to 77 and 63 kilograms a year under al-Nasir and al-Mustansir
respectively, and undermined the ability of the Almohad to attract armies and control
their internal threats.433
Ultimately, the Almohad empire could not survive a war on four fronts,
successive weak leaders, and an adversary that had substantially increased its power base.
After the two adolescent dynastic changes of al-Nasir and al-Mustansir the next two
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caliphs were assassinated. This resulted in the Almohad suffering nearly thirty years of
ineffective leadership from which they would not recover. The Marinids in the Maghreb
and the Christians in al-Andalus had gained momentum. Internal tribal dissention,
dynastic competition, and the loss of confidence of their Muwallad subjects in al-Andalus
and the Arab tribes in the Maghreb, created circumstances that demonstrated that the
governing mechanisms built by the Almohad where insufficient to maintain the largest
North African empire in history in the face of their faltering economy.
The unravelling of the Almohad empire did not occur because the Maliki ulema
from al-Andalus, who were threatened by Ibn Tumart’s philosophy, finally garnered
enough strength to incite a rebellion. Nor could the Almohad decline be blamed on the
independent-minded Arab tribes; there was no increase in these tribe’s ability to rebel
throughout the Almohad reign. Additionally, one questions whether the Marinids would
have been successful in their rebellion had they faced an economically vigorous Almohad
regime. Finally, internal competition for power occurred in all medieval societies and the
Almohad did not lose their empire because of these internecine struggles, some of which
they had already survived. These theories suggested by scholars leave a gap in the
historiography that this thesis hopefully explained. The Almohad empire collapsed, not
from the threats of Maliki ulema, the Marinids, or internal disruption, but conversely,
because they could not control their economy. Economic disintegration opened the door
to these rebellions; not the reverse.
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Appendix: Population Control, Timeline, Popes of period, and Iberian Rivers

Table 8. Muslim to Christian Realm Urbanization and Control
City
Badajoz
Barcelona*
Braga
Burgos
Leon
Barbastro
Coimbra
Lisbon
Toledo
Zaragoza
Cartagena
Elvira
Granada
Jerez de la Frontera
Sevilla
Palma
Almeria
Murcia
Malaga
Valencia

1000
16
24
10
18
15
35
20
15
37
17
33
22
26
19
90
25
27
19
15
26

1200
9
27
10
21
40
35
20
15
45
20
33
22
60
25
90
30
18
15
40
44

Total Iberian Urban Pop.
509
619
Christian Pre Reconquest
83
107
Christian Reconquest
124
135
Total Christian Controlled
207
242
Muslim Urban Population
426
377
% Muslim Urban Control 1000
% Christian Urban Control 1000
% Muslim Urban Control 1200
% Christian Urban Control 1200
Population numbers are in (000).
M/I G: Muslim Control Ibn Ganiya; M/IM Muslim Control Ibn Mardanish
* Barcelona is my calculation based on the sources 1300 pop. of 48.
Source: Paul Bairoch, Leon Batou and Pierre Chevre,
The Populations of European Cities 800-1500
(Geneve: Center of International Economic History, 1988).

C/M
C
C
C
C
C
Chg. C
Chg. C
Chg. C
Chg. C
Chg. C
M
M
M
M
M
M/ I G
M/ IM
M/ IM
M/ IM
M/ IM
% Chg.
22%
29%
9%
17%
-12%
84%
16%
61%
39%
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Table 9. Almohad Timeline from 1086-1248
Battle of Sagrajas
First Crusade (1096-1099)
Ibn Tumart's Journey East
Aragonese Capture Zaragoza
Ibn Tumart's Return from the East
Ibn Tumart recognized as Mahdi
Siege of Marrakech
Consturction of the Walls of Marrakech Walls by Almohad
Battle of Buhayra
Ibn Tumart dies
Battle of Las Fragas
Second Crusade (1147-1150)
Zanata tribes join Almohad
Almohad take Cadiz
First Almohad mission to al-Andalus
Almohad sieze Fez
Almohad take Sevilla (1147-1148)
Abd al-Mu'min captures Marrakech
Normans take al-Mahdiyya
Battle of Setif; conquest of Banu Hilal tibe
Almohad take Granada
Abd al-Mu'min dies
Badajoz restored to Almohad control
Ibn Mardanish dies; Almohad take Murcia
Plague in Marrakech
Ali b. Ishaq b. Ghaniya, Almoravid ruler of Balearcs, captures Bijaya
Battle of Santarem
Almohad lose Battle of 'Umra to Ali b. Ghaniya
Battle of Hamma; Almohad take 'Umra and Gabes
Saladin takes Jerusalem
Third Crusade (1189-1192)
Yaqub al-Mansure takes Roman Venus from Madinal al-Zahra in Cordoba
Battle of Alarcos
Fourth Crusade (1202-1204)
Almohad take Balearic Islands
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa
al-Nasir dies (or is murdered)

1086
1096
1106
1118
1119
1120
1120
1126
1130
1130
1134
1147
1145
1145
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1153
1155
1163
1169
1170
1176
1184
1184
1186
1187
1187
1189
1190
1195
1202
1203
1212
1213

Cordoba Falls
Murcia Falls
Seville Falls
Valencia Falls

1236
1243
1248
1248
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Table 10. Catholic Popes
Years
1088 - 1099
1099 - 1118
1118 - 1119
1119 - 1124
1124 - 1130
1130 - 1143
1143 - 1144
1144 - 1145
1145 - 1153
1153 - 1154
1154 - 1159
1159 - 1181
1181 - 1185
1185 - 1187
1187
1187 - 1191
1191 - 1198
1198 - 1216
1216 - 1227
1227 - 1241

Pope
Urban II
Paschal II
Gelasius II
Callistus II
Honorius II
Innocent II
Celestine II
Lucius II
Eugene III
Anastasius IV
Adrian IV
Alexander III
Lucius III
Urban III
Gregory VIII
Clement III
Celestine III
Innocent III
Honorius III
Gregory IX

Figure 12. River Systems of Spain.
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